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ABSTRACT
MULTIPLE GROUP RELATIONS:
MAINTAINING BALANCE THROUGH INDIRECT CONTACT EFFECTS
MAY 2014
DIALA R. HAWI, B.A., AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT
M.A., AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Linda Tropp
Most research on intergroup relations has focused on two groups, whereby one group’s
attitudes toward another group may change as a result of their contact experiences with
that other group. Yet in real life settings, contexts in which groups come into contact are
likely to involve multiple groups. This research argues that attitudes and perceptions that
members of one group form about another group depend not only on their direct contact
experiences with that group, but also on their relationship with third-party groups, and the
perceived relationships that third-party groups have with the other group. The present
research uses structural balance theory as a guiding framework, and emerging intergroup
research on indirect contact effects, to examine these processes in multi-group contexts.
First, a field survey study in Lebanon examined how Lebanese contact with and attitudes
toward Palestinians (third party) would predict their attitudes toward Israelis. Next, a
laboratory experiment was conducted at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, to test
whether multi-group relations and effects would follow similar patterns in an
experimental setting. Results show evidence of some third party influence, and these
findings and their implications are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Throughout history and in many parts of the world, intergroup conflict has been
maintained and perpetuated through established group structures rather than direct events
and interactions. For instance, one group’s transgression against another may elicit a
hostile and violent response by the latter group if there exists a history or structurally
established negative relation between the two groups, or it may elicit a more tolerant
response if the established relationship has generally been a positive one. However, when
the state of the intergroup relationship is yet to be established or is susceptible to change,
groups may look to their allies and enemies to inform their attitudes, responses, and
future relations. The project described in this paper examines these issues using theories
and methods from the social psychological literature, as well as other work from the
fields of political science, anthropology, history, international relations, and public
policy.
In social psychology, much attention has been dedicated to studies of intergroup
contact that assess perceptions and attitudes of one group towards members of another
group (e.g., Ata, Bastian, & Lusher, 2009; Tausch, Hewstone, Kenworthy, Psaltis,
Schmid, Popan, Cairns, & Hughes, 2010). Extensive research has illustrated the positive
effects that can be gained from contact between groups in terms of improving intergroup
attitudes and changing perceptions of and expectations for contact with outgroup
members (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Until very recently, most studies have typically
examined the relationship between two groups, even though political relations around the
world often involve more than two parties that shape the dynamics of war and peace. In
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these real world settings, where more than two groups exist, how would the structure of
these relations be shaped? Would the presence of a “third” group influence one’s
attitudes toward and relations with other groups? Furthermore, in current peace-building
efforts, programs that are designed to improve relations or end conflict between two
groups may be neglecting the potential influence a third group may have on the impact of
such a program, or inversely, the impact that this program might have on relations with
that third group. This research project aims to uncover the potential influence of an
outside third party on relations between two groups, and in shaping the make-up of the
political and psychological dynamics that occur between multiple groups. It proposes that
the direction of this influence depends on how individuals perceive the third-party group
relating to others. In other words, indirect channels, such as third-party influence, may
exert positive or negative influences on intergroup attitudes and relations.
The intergroup dynamics that occur when more than two groups are involved has
been quite understudied in the field of social psychology. Given the reality of having
multiple groups in single settings, this research proposes that our experiences vis-à-vis
one group can influence our attitudes towards another group, depending on how we
perceive these different groups relating to one another. Balance Theory (Heider, 1958;
originally a theory of interpersonal relations), Image Theory (Hermann, 1999; rooted in
political science), and emerging intergroup literatures – Secondary Transfer Effects
(Pettigrew, 2008) and Extended Contact Effects (Wright et al., 1997) – provide guiding
frameworks to examine these influences in multi-group contexts.
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Direct Contact Effects
One of the most frequently studied strategies to improve intergroup relations
grows from the intergroup contact hypothesis, articulated more than a half-century ago
(Allport, 1954; Williams, 1947). The hypothesis proposes that under optimal conditions
where groups interact cooperatively as equals and with institutional support, contact can
foster positive attitudes between members of different groups (Pettigrew, 1986; Pettigrew
& Tropp, 2006; Sigelman & Welch, 1993). Allport (1954) proposed that when group
members get to know each other through such contact, positive attitudes begin to replace
old prejudices, and extend from the individuals involved in the contact to the larger
groups to which they belong. Thus, the significance of the intergroup contact hypothesis
lies in the generalizability of its effects to the outgroup as a whole (Pettigrew, 1998).
Although most research on contact theory has focused on positive conditions and
effects of contact, there remains an unexplored – yet equally relevant – need to study
negative effects of intergroup contact (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Negative conditions or
experiences in contact with individual outgroup members can potentially lead to
increased negative attitudes towards the entire outgroup (e.g, Paolini, Harwood, & Rubin,
2010; Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000).
Balance Theory and Its Application to Intergroup Contexts
The need for a dual focus on positive and negative dimensions of contact can be
further informed by Heider’s (1958) balance theory. According to Heider (1958), people
are motivated to maintain balance and consistency in their attitudes and relations. For
example, to avoid imbalances, people may feel compelled to like others whom their friends
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also like, or reject those who are disliked by their friends. One way to look at this is
through these commonly known formulas:
My friend’s friend is my friend
My friend’s enemy is my enemy
My enemy’s friend is my enemy
My enemy’s enemy is my friend
Within a single group, two individuals can achieve a state of balance if both
individuals either embrace or reject their group membership, as long as they have positive
attitudes toward or relations with each other (Heider, 1958). In intergroup contexts,
groups may also feel compelled to rely on their enemies and allies when forming
relations with other relevant groups. In line with this argument, the literature in political
science shows that relational imbalances in international affairs increase the likelihood of
conflict (Maoz, Terris, Kuperman, Talmud, 1997). Furthermore, research by Zhong and
colleagues (2008) suggests that a “state of balance is achieved when two parties both like
or dislike a third party” (p. 794). Thus, two groups are more likely to bond over their
common dislike of a third group. A historical account provided by Duara (1997)
illustrates this phenomenon. Although Iranians (mostly Shiites) initially distinguished
themselves from other Muslim sects (e.g., Sunni), these negative sentiments dissolved
following the Arab-Israeli war. With the emergence of a new common enemy (Israel),
conflict between Shiites and Sunnis was eventually replaced by Muslim solidarity.
Therefore, the existence of third parties could impact the creation of common attitudes
and cooperative relations between groups.
However, the explanation provided by Zhong et al. (2008) does not account for all
the processes involved in maintaining multigroup balance. It is possible that regardless of
whether groups share a common dislike (or liking) of a third party, it is the quality of
4

contact and experiences with the third party that could influence attitudes and relations
that one group develops toward a target outgroup. This research contributes to the
existing literature and to the fields of social psychology and international relations by
incorporating balance theory with two potential intergroup mechanisms relevant to
indirect contact effects – secondary transfer and extended contact.
Indirect Effects of Intergroup Contact
In some contexts where direct contact is not feasible, group members may rely on
indirect means to establish and understand intergroup relations. For groups that are
segregated or countries that have limited or no direct channels of communication with
each other, their relations and intergroup attitudes are likely to be influenced by these
indirect contact effects (Dovidio, Eller, & Hewstone, 2011). Therefore, indirect contact
could play a strong role in shaping group members’ attitudes and behaviors toward other
groups. Although the literature on indirect contact effects remains limited (Dovidio et al.,
2011), I propose that some processes, such as those involved in secondary transfer and
extended contact are relevant to understanding how balance theory may function at the
group level. Secondary transfer effects (Pettigrew, 2009) refer to contact’s effects in
shifting intergroup attitudes to groups not directly involved in the contact. Extended
contact effects (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997) refer to how
knowledge of others’ contact experiences can affect one’s attitudes and relations toward
other groups. The section below describes these two indirect mechanisms as studied
within the social psychological literature on intergroup relations.
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Secondary Transfer Processes
Recent studies have explored how intergroup contact affects attitudes not only
toward groups with whom contact occurred, but also toward other groups not directly
involved in any form of contact. Pettigrew (2009) describes the secondary transfer effect
as when positive attitudes resulting from contact with one group can transfer to other
groups. For example, Tausch and colleagues (2010) found that Catholics and Protestants
who had contact in Belfast not only showed more positive attitudes toward each other,
but also these attitudes generalized to racial minorities as well. Therefore, group members
transferred their attitudes from a third party onto outgroups not directly involved in the
contact. A longitudinal study in the U.S. demonstrated the robustness of this effect,
whereby college students reported less prejudice toward their roommate’s ethnic group
over time, as well as toward other ethnic groups beyond their own (Van Laar, Levin,
Sinclair, & Sidanius, 2005).
In the examples presented above, attitudes were assumed to transfer from one
group to the other, based on the level of similarity between these two groups (Pettigrew,
2009). However, it is possible that even when two groups share similarities, they could
have negative relations with each other. According to image theory, enemy relations are
in fact established when two groups do not share compatible goals, even though they may
share similar status and/or power (Alexander, Brewer, & Livingston, 2005). In addition,
an enemy is defined by a state as one whose intentions or actions are seen as threatening
that state’s interests (Maoz, Terris, Kuperman, & Talmud, 2007). Consequently,
intergroup attitudes would be associated with the particular relations between the groups
and the resulting images they form of one another (Alexander, Brewer, & Hermann,
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1999). Taken together, these theories imply that perceived relations between a third party
and target outgroup would be a critical predictor of attitudes that one forms toward the
target outgroup. Thus, while Pettigrew (2009) would propose that this influence is based
on perceived similarity between the third party and target outgroup, this paper argues that
it may be based on the perceived relationship – whether positive or negative – between
the third party and target outgroup. Such a perspective would also be consistent with the
basic tenets of balance theory, since attitude transference based strictly on similarity
would result in an imbalanced state. In other words, perceived relations between a third
party and a target outgroup could also influence the transference of attitudes from one
group to the next. If applied to group contexts, balance theory would suggest that an ideal
state requires balanced relations between groups (Heider, 1958).
Extended Contact Processes
In addition, the extended contact effect states that the mere knowledge that one’s
ingroup member has established close relationships with outgroup members can lead one
to develop more positive attitudes towards that outgroup (Wright, Aron, McLaughlinVolpe, & Ropp, 1997); as such, ingroup members can guide and influence individuals’
intergroup attitudes and behaviors through vicarious experiences of friendship. In a study
among Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, knowledge that ingroup members
had friends in the other group predicted more positive intergroup attitudes (Paolini,
Hewstone, Cairns, & Voci, 2004). Proponents of the extended contact effect have also
highlighted the significance of this process, particularly in situations where two groups
have limited opportunities for direct contact (Eller, Abrams, & Gomez, 2012; Christ,
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Hewstone, Tausch, Wagner, Voci, Hughes, & Cairns, 2010; Turner, Hewstone, Voci, &
Vonofakou, 2008).
I propose that balance theory functions primarily on the basis of these indirect
processes to guide relations between multiple groups. In some multi-group contexts
where intergroup hostility exists (such as the Middle East), groups may have minimal or
no contact with each another (e.g., Lebanese and Israeli citizens). In these cases, it may
be their experiences with third-party groups (other than the target outgroup) and extended
contact with target groups that would influence their attitudes. The pattern of findings
described above would replicate in regions where contact is not common, feasible, or
sanctioned by authorities or one’s ingroup.
Finally, greater attention is needed to explore both positive and negative processes
involved in intergroup contact. Research on contact has focused mainly on positive
effects of direct and indirect contact on attitudes, but a disconnect remains between such
contact research and what relations exist in real conflict settings (e.g., Dovidio &
Gaertner, 2003; Brown & Hewstone, 2005). In multigroup settings, not only do groups
have to contend with the negative contact experiences, attitudes, or relations that occur
with one group, but also with how these processes unfold in the presence of influential
third party groups. In summary, when multiple groups exist, relational dynamics become
more complex than what the current literature on intergroup relations presents.
The “Third Party” Effect
In summary, as balance theory might propose, attitudes and relations toward one
target outgroup could depend – at least partially – on attitudes and relations toward a
relevant third party group. Furthermore, just as positive attitudes may transfer from
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experiences with one outgroup to another group, it is conceivable that negative attitudes
could also transfer from experiences with a third party group to a target outgroup with
whom contact may not have occurred. The quality of contact (positive or negative) that a
primary group has with a third party would lead this primary group to establish
correspondingly positive or negative attitudes toward the third party. Group members
who observe or learn that this third party group has engaged in positive or negative
interactions with a target outgroup may then modify their attitudes to correspond with the
information they had just received about this contact. If the third party group is one with
whom they have positive relations, then people’s attitudes towards the target outgroup are
more likely to match those they have of the third party outgroup. If they have negative
relations with the third party outgroup, however, then it is more likely that any contact
that occurs between the third party and target outgroup would have the reverse effect on
people’s attitudes. Following the algebraic equations of balance theory, the following
third party effects are predicted; where “TPG” refers to third-party group, and “TO”
refers to target outgroup:
“I like TPG + I perceive a positive relation between TPG & TO  I like TO”
(i.e., if “TO” are allies of my “TPG” allies, then “TO” are my allies)
“I like TPG + I perceive a negative relation between TPG & TO  I dislike TO”
(i.e., if “TO” are enemies of my “TPG”allies, then “TO” are my enemies)
“I dislike TPG + I perceive a positive relation between TPG & TO  I dislike TO”
(i.e., if “TO” are allies of my “TPG” enemies, then “TO” are my enemies)
“I dislike TPG + I perceive a negative relation between TPG & TO  I like TO”
(i.e., if “TO” are enemies of my “TPG” enemies, then “TO” are my allies)
In other words, contact with a third party should affect one’s attitudes toward that
third party, which should in turn affect attitudes toward a target outgroup; these effects
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should depend on the perceived relation between the third party and target outgroup, and
they should occur independent of any effects of direct contact between an individual and
the target outgroup.
The first study in this dissertation examines these issues in the context of
Lebanese attitudes towards and relations with Israelis, as a function of their experiences
with Palestinians. In this particular context, despite the minimal or complete lack of
contact between Lebanese and Israelis, contact still occurs between Palestinians and
Israelis. Therefore, Lebanese may base their attitudes or relations toward Israelis on the
attitudes or relations they hold toward Palestinians and their knowledge about these
Palestinians’ attitudes or relations with Israelis. The study presented here tests these
relationships by assessing Lebanese contact, attitudes, and relations with Palestinians,
and perceived attitudes or relations between Palestinians and Israelis, as predictors for
Lebanese attitudes or relations toward Israelis.
Research Goals and Hypotheses
The majority of the research that has been conducted on intergroup relations has
been based on processes that occur between two groups in conflict, and not enough
attention has been dedicated to contexts that involve more than two groups. Moreover,
the majority of studies on secondary transfer and extended contact effects has focused on
positive intergroup processes, and has for the most part neglected the influence of
negative processes. The application of balance theory in a multi-group context relies
primarily on people’s perceptions of general relations between two groups to help them
formulate or modify their attitudes towards one of these groups. These mechanisms are
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explored in the studies presented in here, in an effort to distinguish between negative and
positive intergroup effects.
By applying balance theory to intergroup relations, this research examines how
third-party influences occur through processes akin to secondary transfer effects, but with
a few theoretical extensions. First, Pettigrew (2009) suggests that secondary transfer
effects occur through mechanisms such as perceived similarities between the group with
whom contact occurred and a separate target outgroup. In the present research, I test
whether other factors, such as perceived relations between these groups, are equally – or
perhaps more – important for predicting attitudes toward the target outgroup. Alexander
et al. (1999) have shown that participants who are given information about the relation
between two groups subsequently generate images, such as enemy and ally, and attitudes
consistent with the stereotypes of these group images. In multi-group contexts, these
consequent attitudes would shape the enemy versus ally relations that maintain structural
balance between groups.
This study also explores effects related to extended contact processes that occur
when merely knowing of an ingroup member’s friendship with members of an outgroup
can lead people to develop more positive attitudes toward that outgroup as a whole
(Wright et al., 1997). While research on extended contact restricts itself to contexts that
involve a shared identity between members of the same group, this project proposes that
extended contact effects can take place through members of “third-party” groups as well.
In addition, while extended contact research has typically focused on positive outcomes,
such as improved intergroup attitudes (Wright et al., 1997), contact that occurs at the
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negative end of the spectrum may similarly influence attitudes, albeit in an opposite,
negative direction.
In sum, the dissertation argues that our attitudes towards a target outgroup are
affected by our relationship with a third party group and our perceptions of relations
between that third party group and the target outgroup. The studies described below aim
to answer three main questions: First, when there is an established relationship between a
third party and target outgroup, would one’s attitudes or relations toward the target
outgroup depend on the perceived relationship between one’s group and the third party?
Alternatively, would they depend on one’s perceptions of the third party’s attitudes and
behaviors towards the target group? Finally, to what extent would one’s attitudes toward
a target outgroup depend on the perceived relationship between the third party and target
outgroup, or on the perceived similarity between the two?
The extant literature on intergroup contact has not sufficiently explained the
possible processes that occur when one group is faced with multiple other groups. Most
of this work has also looked at positive contact and its effects, and more research is
needed to understand negative contact effects and their potential for generalization (see
Barlow, Paolini, Pederson, et al., 2012; Paolini et al., 2010). Direct and indirect contact
effects could all potentially manifest themselves in negative and positive experiences and
the formation of corresponding attitudes.
Accordingly, in multi-group settings, individuals’ attitudes toward a target
outgroup are likely to depend on how a third party group responds to that target outgroup,
and on the relationship between one’s own group and the third party group. Participants
would express more positive or negative attitudes towards a target group based on their
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own relationship with this third party group, and based on the perceived relations
between the third party and target outgroups.
In summary, this research relies on balance theory as a tool to describe how the
presence of one group may influence the attitudes and relations that develop between two
other groups. These processes occur through indirect contact mechanisms, such that (see
Figure 1):
(1) If one group develops a positive attitude towards or relations with a third party group,
then the valence of attitudes or relations it develops toward a target outgroup will be
positively correlated with the valence of the perceived attitudes or relations between
the third party and target groups.
(2) If one group holds negative attitudes/relations toward a third party group, then the
valence of subsequent attitudes/relations it develops toward a target outgroup will be
negatively correlated with the valence of the perceived attitudes/relations between the
third party and target outgroups.
To examine these processes in multiple group relations, two studies are presented.
The first study is a field survey in Lebanon that investigates these issues in terms of
relationships between Lebanese, Palestinians, and Israelis. The goal of this survey study
is to test how Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis (target outgroup) may be predicted
through their attitudes and relations with Palestinians (third party). An experimental study
with minimal groups then tested whether individuals’ attitudes towards a target outgroup
would be affected by their experiences with a third-party group and that third-party
group’s experiences with the target outgroup.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1: FIELD SURVEY OF THIRD PARTY EFFECTS:
TESTING THE ROLES OF PALESTINIANS IN PREDICTING LEBANESE
ATTITUDES TOWARD ISRAELIS
Study 1 focuses on Lebanese relations with Palestinians and Israelis, and how
Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis vary in connection to their relationship with
Palestinians. After 1948, many Palestinian refugees had to immigrate and seek shelter in
various regions of the Arab world, including Lebanon. Unfortunately, not all Lebanese
people welcomed them with open arms. For many Lebanese, Palestinians represented a
threat to power and resources. For others, the Palestinian Resistance movement
threatened to cause a revolutionary social and political change to the Arab society as a
whole (Barakat, 1971). Importantly, Lebanon had also become an alternative
battleground between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel (Mullany,
1991). Such threats led to increased friction between Palestinian refugees and many
Lebanese, and historians have often attributed the Lebanese 15-year civil war to this
tension (Mullany, 1991). At the same time, many Lebanese have been strong allies of
Palestine and Palestinian groups in Lebanon, united in their antipathy toward Israel and
Israelis in what is referred to as the “Arab-Israeli conflict” (Hudson, 1978). Others may
express sympathy towards the Palestinian cause, but do not necessarily hold positive
attitudes towards Palestinians, and not all Lebanese feel negatively toward Israelis.
Indeed, Lebanese attitudes towards Palestinians and Israelis vary greatly depending on
their personal experiences and points of view. Some extreme views have called for the
complete annihilation of the state of Israel and the expulsion of its citizens, while others
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have held less harsh attitudes and expressed some willingness to establish dialogue with
their Southern neighbors. One goal of this research is to predict this variability in
Lebanese attitudes towards Israelis, by examining them within the context of their
attitudes towards Palestinians, and how such third-party effects serve to maintain a
balanced state of group relations.
The Lebanese context is a particularly useful – albeit challenging – one for
examining these issues, because there are restricted opportunities for Lebanese people to
engage in contact with Israelis that might impact their intergroup attitudes. As mentioned
previously, research has emphasized the importance of indirect contact effects,
particularly when opportunities for direct contact between two groups are minima l
(Turner et al., 2008; Wright et al., 1997). This situation clearly applies to the context of
Lebanon, where contact between Lebanese and Israeli citizens is, in fact, illegal. Having
no contact with Israelis, the attitudes that Lebanese individuals develop towards Israelis
may then rely heavily on their experiences with Palestinians (with whom they have had
more contact), and be informed by their perceptions of relations between Palestinians and
Israelis. The same processes would also underlie how Lebanese visualize the structure of
relations between the three groups, such that their perceptions of relations between
Lebanese and Israelis in general may be informed by how they perceive LebanesePalestinian relations as well as how they perceive Palestinian-Israeli relations. That said,
it is also worth reminding the reader about the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which
has created a great deal of hostility between the two groups. This research looks at
whether Lebanese perceptions of the intensity of this hostility and animosity might then
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influence their own attitudes toward Israelis and/or their own perceptions of LebaneseIsraeli relations.
In the current study, direct contact between Lebanese and Israelis could not be
assessed, due to the sensitivity of that question in the Lebanese context. Specifically, the
researcher was cautioned not to include items assessing direct Lebanese-Israeli contact
since this particular act is illegal and considered a form of state treason in Lebanon. As
such, inclusion of such items would have likely aroused suspicion of the researcher’s
intentions, which could, at the very least, reduce participants’ trust in and willingness to
respond to the survey, and at a possible extreme, endanger the security of the researcher.
Correspondingly, the predicted effects were tested without controlling for direct contact
between Lebanese and Israelis, which tends to be minimal given the political context.
The survey in Study 1 focuses on Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis – in addition
to how they see the nature of the relationship between Lebanese and Israelis in general –
as a function of Lebanese perceptions of Palestinian attitudes and/or relations with
Israelis, as well as Lebanese attitudes and/or relations with Palestinians. Since previous
research has found that Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis vary (Mullany, 1991; Barakat,
1971), one goal of this research is to predict this variability by examining them within the
context of their attitudes towards Palestinians, and how such third-party effects serve to
maintain a balanced state of group relations. In the Lebanese context, opportunities for
direct contact between Lebanese and Israelis are assumed (since they cannot be directly
tested) to be minimal and Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis and general perceptions of
Lebanese-Israeli relations may then rely heavily on the informative role that relations
with Palestinians could play. For example, if Lebanese have had positive contact
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experiences with Palestinians, and know of Palestinians’ negative contact experiences
with Israelis, this could lead Lebanese to develop negative attitudes toward Israelis. On
the same note, if Lebanese have had negative experiences with Palestinians, and know of
Palestinians’ negative contact experiences with Israelis, then Lebanese attitudes toward
Israelis may be more positive than in the previous example.
In summary, the hypotheses for this study are:
(1) Lebanese participants’ attitudes toward Palestinians, combined with their perceptions
of Palestinian-Israeli relations, will subsequently influence their attitudes toward
Israelis.
(2) Lebanese participants’ perceptions of Lebanese-Palestinian relations, combined with
their perceptions of Palestinian-Israeli relations, will subsequently influence their
perceptions of Lebanese-Israeli relations.
(3) In predicting Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis and perceived Lebanese-Israeli
relations, the effects of perceived relations between Palestinians and Israelis will be
observed beyond the role of perceived similarity.
Participants and Sample
A community sample of 400 Lebanese participants from across the country was
recruited over a four-month period (August – November 2011) through their affiliations
with several non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) that agreed to assist with the data
collection process. Items assessed Lebanese direct contact experiences and resulting
attitudes toward Palestinians, as well as the perceived relations and perceived similarities
between Palestinians and Israelis. Additional variables of primary interest included
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Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis and their perceptions of relations between Lebanese
and Israelis.
Demographic Characteristics of Community Sample
As part of this survey, respondents answered a number of demographic indicators,
including age, gender, religion, political orientation and political party support. Around
5% of respondents did not provide their age, and 3.7% did not provide their gender.
Larger proportions of respondents offered no response to questions about religion (15%),
political orientation (33.8%), and political party support (33.3%). Given the political
instability and sectarian strife in the region, these results were somewhat expected.
Earlier that year (January 2011), the Lebanese government had collapsed and some party
leaders were talking about changing alliances. A Hezbollah-dominated cabinet was
finally formed in June of that year. These events, combined with the wars and political
and religious tension over the years, has led cynicism and apprehension about political
and religious allegiances.
Of those who did respond to the demographic items, the mean age was 25.5 years
(SD=6.63), ranging from 16 to 63 years old. As for gender, 208 responded as male (52%)
and 177 responded as female (44.3%). The majority of respondents were Muslim (65%),
with Muslim Shiites making up 44.8% of the total sample (N=179). Christians made up
18% of the sample (N=72), with the rest belonging to minority groups or undeclared.
This religious make-up is to some extent representative of the current religious
distribution in Lebanon, although an official national census has not been conducted
since 1932 (Maktabi, 1999), due to the political sensitivity of the matter (U.S.
Department of State, 2001). Although not necessarily accurate, more recent estimates for
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Christians in Lebanon range from 39% to 41.5% of the population, while Muslims are
thought to make up around 60% of the population (Central Intelligence Agency, 2014;
U.S. Department of State, 2013).
Half of the respondents (N=200, 50%) generally regarded themselves as
proponents of the March 8 political block, while 65 respondents (16.3%) regarded
themselves as proponents of the March 14 political block, and the rest (33.7%) either
declared themselves as “other” or “undecided” or did not provide a response. This was
again not unexpected, with the current make-up of the government and the turmoil that
the March 14 block was going through. Finally, in terms of political parties, the two most
supported parties were Hezbollah (N=58, 14.5%), which belonged to the March 8
movement, and the Future Movement (N=46, 11.5%), which belonged to the March 14
movement.
In addition, information about respondents’ education level and income level
were gathered. In terms of education, 383 respondents provided a response, and the
majority (N=229; 59.8%) reported reaching a college or university education, while only
12 respondents (3.1%) reported achieving basic education, 66 respondents (17.2%)
acquired a secondary education (the equivalent of high school level), 32 respondents
(8.4%) received technical school education, and 44 (11.5%) had reached a graduate level
of education. These demographics parallel what surveys from other sources, such as the
World Bank database, which has found that around 51.6 % of Lebanese enroll in higher
education (The World Bank, 2009). As for income, only 357 people provided responses
to this question, the majority of whom (N = 109; 30.5%) reported an average monthly
income ranging between $1,001 – 1,500. 42 respondents (11.8%) reported earning less
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than $500 a month, and 88 respondents (24.6%) reported earning between $501 – 1,000
every month. Only 23 respondents (6.4%) reported earning between $1,501 – 2,500 a
month, and only 21 respondents (5.9%) reported earning more than $3,500 per month.
Measures
The survey included measures adapted from pre-existing literature on intergroup
contact, as well as measures based on interview data conducted prior to the study, to help
inform the research and create a culturally sensitive survey (see Appendix A for primary
survey measures). Responses to survey items listed below are scored on 7-point Likert
scales as indicated below.
Primary Measures to Test Third-Party Effects
The goal of this study is to assess whether Lebanese attitudes toward a third party
(i.e., Palestinians) can predict Lebanese attitudes toward a target outgroup (i.e., Israelis),
through the perceived relations between the third party and the target outgroup (i.e.,
between Palestinians and Israelis). Therefore, key measures in the survey assess 1)
Lebanese attitudes toward Palestinians, 2) Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, and 3)
perceived relations between Palestinians and Israelis.
Lebanese Attitudes toward Palestinians
A general evaluation scale asked Lebanese participants to describe how they felt
towards Palestinians (based on Wright et al., 1997). On a scale from “1” to “7”,
participants were asked to indicate, how negative/positive, cold/warm, hostile/friendly,
and suspicious/trusting they felt towards Palestinians. Responses to the four items were
averaged into one attitudes measure (α = .92).
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Perceived Relations between Lebanese and Palestinians
To measure respondents’ perceptions of Lebanese-Palestinian relations in general,
participants were asked to report the extent to which they perceived relations between
Lebanese and Palestinians to be cooperative-competitive or allies-enemies (α = .92) on a
7-point scale.
Perceived Attitudes and Relations between Palestinians and Israelis
To test the proposed moderating influence of perceived attitudes and relations in
the present research, participants were presented with two measures. First, to assess their
perceptions of Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis, they were asked to rate to what extent
they perceived Palestinians to feel friendly-hostile, warm-cold, hostile/friendly, and
suspicious/trusting toward Israelis (α = .98). To measure their perceptions of PalestinianIsraeli relations in general, participants were asked to state the extent to which they
perceived relations between Palestinians and Israelis to be cooperative-competitive or
allies-enemies (α = .92) on a 7-point scale.
Lebanese Attitudes toward Israelis
The same general evaluation scale used above measured how Lebanese
participants felt toward Israelis as the outcome variable. Responses to these four items
were also averaged into one attitudes measure (α = .99).
Perceived Relations between Lebanese and Israelis
In addition, using comparable items described previously for perceived relations
between Palestinians and Israelis, respondents were asked to report on their perceptions
of the relations between Lebanese and Palestinians (α = .92) and between Lebanese and
Israelis (α = .92).
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Secondary Measures to Test Third Party Effects
In addition, several other measures were included to examine related processes
and mechanisms.
Lebanese Contact with Palestinians
Given that direct contact experience predicts intergroup attitudes (e.g., Pettigrew
& Tropp, 2006), direct contact between Lebanese and Palestinians were measured in
several ways. Lebanese participants indicated how often they have had contact with
members of each group, as well as the number of acquaintances and friends they had
from each group.
Other items measured the extent to which Lebanese participants’ contact
experiences with Palestinians were generally positive or negative (e.g., How often have
you had had positive/negative contact experiences with Palestinians?”; modified from
Barlow et al., 2012). Additional items assessing contact quality asked participants to
indicate their levels of agreement to statements such as “When I interact with
Palestinians, the contact is almost always pleasant/hostile” (modified from Islam &
Hewstone, 1993). Responses to 15 contact items were averaged into one aggregate
measure, and the reliability coefficient for these item scales was high (α = .82).
Perceived Similarity
Perceptions of similarity between Lebanese and Palestinians (α = .91), between
Lebanese and Israelis (α = .96), and between Palestinians and Israelis (α = .94) were also
assessed. In three separate items, participants were asked the extent to which they
perceived each pair of groups to be similar in political ideology, cultural ideology, and
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goals and interests. The scale ranged from “1”, being “very different” , to “7”, being
“very similar”.
Extended Contact
Also relevant to the goals of the present research, “third-party” extended contact
was assessed through four items asking participants to report their knowledge of
members of the third-party group (Palestinians) who have had positive and negative
contact with members of the target outgroup (e.g., “How many Palestinians do you know
who have had positive/negative contact experiences with Israelis?”). The survey also
included items that asked about perceived quality of Palestinians’ contact experiences
with Israelis (e.g., “When the Palestinians you know interact with Israelis, the contact is
almost always pleasant/hostile”), with item responses ranging from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 7 (strongly agree). Responses on 14 items were averaged into one aggregate measure,
with high reliability (α = .80).
Results
To test the hypotheses through the measures described above, regression analyses
were used to predict Lebanese participants’ attitudes toward and relations with Israelis. In
testing for third party effects, Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis (“Lebanese Attitudes
toward Israelis” measure) will be predicted by 1) Lebanese attitudes toward Palestinians,
and 2) Lebanese perceptions of attitudes and relations between Palestinians and Israelis.
The interaction between these predictor variables was tested to explain Lebanese attitudes
toward Israelis. In addition, secondary analyses examined the role of perceived
similarities between Palestinians and Israelis (“secondary transfer” mechanism) and
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Lebanese knowledge of Palestinians’ contact experiences with Israelis “extended
contact” mechanism), as other possible predictors of Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis.
Mean scores and standard deviations of the study measures are shown in Table 1.
Not surprisingly, Lebanese report more positive attitudes toward Palestinians than toward
Israelis, t(358) = 26.2, p<.001. Similarly, Lebanese report more positive LebanesePalestinian relations than Lebanese-Israeli relations, t(374) = 23.0, SE=.13, p<.001.
Interestingly, though, although participants reported very negative Palestinian-Israeli
relations, on average they reported that these were less negative than Lebanese-Israeli
relations, t(383) = 4.1, SE=.04, p<.001. This is an interesting observation on Lebanese
participants’ perceptions that there is stronger enmity between Lebanese and Israelis than
between Palestinians and Israelis. In addition, the mean scores for perceived similarity
were in the expected directions. First, participants found that Lebanese were more similar
to Palestinians than to Israelis, t(376) = 27.36, SE=.11, p<.001. Participants also found
that while both Palestinians and Lebanese have very little in common with Israelis,
Palestinians might be a little more similar to Israelis than Lebanese are, t(376)=3.80,
SE=.04, p<.001. This could make sense since most Palestinians and Israelis live in close
proximity and have inhabited the same land for centuries (under different group names).
Table 2 shows correlations between all measures, with noteworthy observations.
First, as expected positive contact experience with Palestinians is related to positive
attitudes toward Palestinians, r=.45, p<.001. It was also related to more positive
perceptions of Lebanese-Palestinian relations, r=.19, p<.001, as well as more negative
perceptions of Palestinian-Israeli relations, r= -.16, p<.001 and of Lebanese-Israeli
relations, r= -.16, p<.001. A more interesting finding is that more positive attitudes
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toward Palestinians were correlated with more positive attitudes toward Israelis, r=.29,
p<.001.
On the other hand, there is a significant positive relationship between perceived
Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis and Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, r=.92, p<.001,
such that the more respondents perceived that Palestinians felt positively toward Israelis,
the more they themselves felt positively toward Israelis. The data also revealed that
attitudes toward Israelis are negatively correlated with perceived Lebanese-Palestinian
relations, r= -.55, p<.001, as well as perceived Lebanese-Palestinian similarities, r= 33,
p<.001 and Palestinian-Israeli similarities, r=74, p<.001.Moreover, the more respondents
felt that any of the pairs of groups were similar, the more positively they felt toward
Israelis. Finally, it is worth noting that perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations are negatively
correlated with perceived Lebanese-Palestinian relations, r= -.19, p<.001, but positively
correlated with perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations, r=.87, p<.001. Therefore, when
respondents felt that Lebanese and Palestinians were cooperative allies, or the more they
perceived that Palestinians and Israelis were competitive enemies, they more they felt
that Lebanese and Israelis were competitive enemies as well.
Of the 400 respondents, only 234 indicated that they have had any form of contact
with Palestinians, but four of these did not provide responses on the contact measures.
Thus, for analyses involving that measure, responses from 230 participants were
analyzed. The mean score for quality of contact and for attitudes toward Palestinians
were both above average (M = 5.18, SD = .94 and M = 5.35, SD = 1.2, respectively). A
linear regression analysis reveals that the contact of quality that Lebanese respondents
have with Palestinians directly and positively influence their attitudes toward them. Thus,
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greater positive contact experiences with Palestinians more positive attitudes toward
Palestinians, among Lebanese participants, b = .55, SE = .08, p <.001.
Before proceeding with the analysis below, however, it is important to explain
some necessary transformations that were performed due to the uniqueness of these data.
With a politically charged questionnaire that involved relations and attitudes toward
Israelis, participants’ responses were expectedly extreme and highly skewed. For
example, the mean for participant attitudes toward Israelis is 1.96 on a 7-point scale, with
a median of 1.00, i.e. the lowest score on the scale, where 71.8% of participants reported
the most negative attitudes toward Israelis. This leaves 28.2% of the values spread across
all other values for that construct (see Figure 2 for a sample distribution of Lebanese
attitudes toward Israelis, compared to Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis). This positive
skewness was found among most variables that refer to relations with Israelis, including
perceptions of Palestinian contact with as well as attitudes toward Israelis, Lebanese and
Palestinian relations with Israelis, and Lebanese and Palestinian relations with
Israelis1.As such, it was suspected that the assumptions were violated due to the extreme
non-normality in the data, so these variables were split and a binary logistic regression,
which does not have the assumption of normally distributed residuals, was conducted. In
this context and in the case of politically charged responses, the loss of information
occurring as a result of splitting responses into dichotomous variables is both minimal
and considerably irrelevant to the research question being addressed (for more
information, see Farrington & Loeber, 2000).
With this information, these measures should not be treated as pure continuous
variables. Therefore, the variables were split into two groups, based on whether they were

26

extreme or not. This approach allows us to distinguish between (1) those who hold
strictly negative attitudes toward Israelis, and (2) those who sway at all from that score.
This distinction reflects the nature of the Lebanese political climate, where citizens are
expected to dislike Israelis, and thus those who do not strictly adhere to that norm would
belong to a category of their own. In this analysis, the question becomes dichotomous,
such that it focuses on whether a respondent is someone different from the majority or
not. Splitting the variable here may be the appropriate approach given the skewed
distribution of data and the question rased above. When asked in this manner, running a
regression analysis could not inform us about whether respondents deviated from the
norm, but a logistic regression does exactly that.
Logistic regression (LR) is a multivariable method of analysis that is commonly
used for modeling dichotomous outcomes in social science research, specifically to
overcome limitations or ordinary least squares regression analyses (Bagley, White, &
Golomb, 2001; Peng & So, 2002). Therefore, logistic regression will be used to study the
relation between the transformed categorical outcome variables of the Lebanese dataset,
where the model would predict the logit of the outcome variable from the predictor
variable
This first section examines a test of the hypotheses predicting Lebanese attitudes
toward Israelis through their attitudes toward Palestinians as well as either (1) their
perceptions about Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis or (2) their perceptions about
Palestinian-Israeli relations. The section that follows includes another relevant analysis,
showing how perceived relations between Lebanese and Israelis could be predicted by the
perceived relations between Lebanese and Palestinians and between Palestinians and
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Israelis. This latter test sheds an additional light on how third parties shape structural
balance in the way individuals perceive relations between multiple groups. Finally, the
influence of perceived Palestinian-Israeli attitudes and Palestinian-Israeli relations are
each examined while controlling for the potential influence of Palestinian-Israeli
similarities.
Predicting Lebanese Attitudes toward Israelis
For the following analyses that involve constructs that have been transformed to
dichotomous variables, binary logistic regressions were conducted, first testing the
interaction of Attitudes toward Palestinians X Perceptions of Palestinian Attitudes
toward Israelis in predicting Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis. The model was fit to the
data to explain the predicted odds of positive Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, while
including two main effects – Lebanese attitudes toward Palestinians and perceived
Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis – and their interaction. Entering both predictors and
their interaction term into the analysis reveals a significant omnibus test of the overall
model, X2 = 128.56, p<.001, and this indicates that the model is a good fit to the data. In
addition, the estimated variance explained by the model is around 43%, Nagelkerke
R2=.433. The classification table for Block 1 indicates that the model correctly classifies
81.4% of the cases, which is an improvement over a model that does not include the
predictors (Block 0). Based on these indicators, we turn to look at the regression slopes.
First, controlling for other variables in the model, perceived Palestinian attitudes
toward Israelis significantly predict Lebanese respondents’ attitudes toward Israelis,
b=3.95, SE=1.41, Wald=7.87, Exp(B)=.019, p<.001. Therefore, as perceived Palestinian
attitudes toward Israelis change from negative to more positive, Lebanese attitudes

28

toward Israelis also become more positive. On the other hand, Lebanese attitudes toward
Palestinians also predict their attitudes toward Israelis, but not in the expected direction,
b=.35, SE=.12, Wald=9.33, Exp(B)=1.43, p=.002; more positive attitudes toward
Palestinians predicted more positive attitudes toward Israelis. There was no significant
interaction effect on attitudes toward Israelis, however, b=.18, SE=.25, Wald=.51,
Exp(B)=1.20, p=.476 (when examined separately in a model though, the interaction term
significantly predicted attitudes toward Israelis, b=.48, SE=.06, Wald=61.69, Exp(B)=.62,
p<.001), indicating that perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis is a considerably
stronger predictor of Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis). The graph depicting this
interaction is presented below (Figure 3; see Table 3 for results).
Predicting Perceived Relations between Lebanese and Israelis
Second, a binary logistic regression tested the interaction of Perceived LebanesePalestinian Relations X Perceived Palestinian-Israeli Relations in the prediction of
Perceived Lebanese-Israeli Relations. Entering both predictors and their interaction term
into the analysis reveals a significant omnibus test of the overall model, X2 = 93.29,
p<.001, indicating a good fit of the model to the data. In addition, the estimated variance
explained by the model is around 33%, Nagelkerke R2=.329. The classification table for
Block 1 indicates that the model correctly classifies 79.5% of the cases, which is an
improvement over a model that does not include the predictors (Block 0) and correctly
classifies 76% of the cases.
Controlling for other variables, perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations significantly
predict perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations, b=3.49, SE=.84, Wald=17.17, Exp(B)=.03,
p<.001. Therefore, as perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations change from allies to
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enemies, perceptions of Lebanese-Israeli relations become more positive (more allied).
Furthermore, perceived Lebanese-Palestinian relations also predict Lebanese-Israeli
relations, b=-.33, SE=.13, Wald=6.76, Exp(B)=.72, p=.009. In other words, higher
perceptions of allied relations between Lebanese and Palestinians predict higher
perceptions of enemy relations between Lebanese and Israelis. However, there was no
significant interaction effect on perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations, b=.25, SE=.18,
Wald=2.02, Exp(B)=1.29, p=.16 (but when examined alone, without controlling for the
main variables, the interaction significantly predicted attitudes toward Israelis, b=.48,
SE=.06, Wald=61.69, Exp(B)=.62, p<.001). The graph depicting this interaction is
presented below (Figure 4; see Table 4 for summary of outcome statistics).
Adding Perceived Similarity as a Predictor
Next, the influence of intergroup similarity was examined alongside the two
predictors, perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis and perceived PalestinianIsraeli relations. First, Palestinian-Israeli similarities was included in the same model
with perceived Palestinian attitudes, X2 = 129.80, p<.001, Nagelkerke R2=.398. The
model correctly classifies 79.3% of the cases (an improvement over a model that does not
include the predictors, 71.8%). Controlling for perceived similarity, perceived Palestinian
attitudes toward Israelis significantly predict perceived respondents’ attitudes toward
Israelis, b=2.60, SE=.31, Wald=70.50, Exp(B)=.07, p<.001. Perceived Palestinian-Israeli
similarities, on the other hand, do not predict respondents’ attitudes, b=-.46, SE=.30,
Wald=2.43, Exp(B)=.63, p=.119, when controlling for Palestinian attitudes toward
Israelis. Therefore, it is perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis – not perceived
Palestinian-Israeli similarities – that predict perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations.
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Finally, Palestinian-Israeli similarities was included in the same model with
perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations, X2 = 111.75, p<.001, Nagelkerke R2=.356. The
model correctly classifies 76.5% of the cases (an improvement over a model that does not
include the predictors, 73.8%). Controlling for perceived similarity, perceived
Palestinian-Israeli relations significantly predict perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations,
b=2.59, SE=.30, Wald=75.93, Exp(B)=.08, p<.001. Perceived Palestinian-Israeli
similarities also predict Lebanese-Israeli relations, b=-.61, SE=.27, Wald=5.28,
Exp(B)=.54, p=.022. Therefore, perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations predict perceived
Lebanese-Israeli relations, above and beyond (and more strongly than) the influence of
perceived similarity.
Discussion
This research tests how attitudes and perceptions that members of one group form
about a target outgroup depend on their relationship with third-party groups, and the
perceived relations that third-party groups have with the target outgroup. To test this in a
field context, a survey study was conducted with a sample of Lebanese participants, who
were asked to report their attitudes and experiences with Palestinians as well as their
perceptions about Lebanese-Palestinian-Israeli relations, and their own attitudes toward
Israelis. As expected, Lebanese respondents felt more positively toward Palestinians and
very negatively toward Israelis. They also perceived relations between Palestinians and
Israelis, as well as relations between Lebanese and Israelis, to be extremely negative.
Attitudes toward Israelis
A primary focus of this paper was to examine whether a third-party group – in
this case, Palestinians – would predict the attitudes that respondents held toward the
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target outgroup – Israelis – and the relationship they perceived Lebanese and Israelis to
have. Specifically, the paper predicted an interaction between one’s attitudes toward
Palestinians and perceptions of Palestinian-Israeli attitudes to influence respondents’
attitudes. The data, however, only partially supported the hypotheses. To begin with,
when comparing the first two potential predictors (attitudes toward Palestinians and
perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis), data from this study indicated that the
attitudes that respondents held toward Israelis were only influenced by how they thought
Palestinians felt toward Israelis. In other words, Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis were
more positive if they thought that Palestinians felt more positively toward Israelis as well.
This statement (and others) could be framed a different way as well, such that when
respondents thought Palestinians felt more negatively toward Israelis, they also felt more
negatively toward Israelis. However, the way respondents felt toward Palestinians in
general did not significantly influence the way they felt toward Israelis. This only varied
if respondents felt that Palestinians did not feel extremely negatively toward Israelis. In
other words, when Palestinians were thought to hold very hostile attitudes toward Israelis,
then Lebanese respondents felt negatively toward Israelis as well, regardless of how they
felt toward Palestinians. However, when Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis were seen as
less hostile, then the way Lebanese felt toward Palestinians made a difference. In this
case, when Palestinians were thought to feel even slightly more positively toward Israelis,
then the more respondents liked Palestinians, the more positively they also felt toward
Israelis. Hence, the processes underlying structural balance occurred only when
Palestinians were not perceived to hold very negative attitudes toward Israelis. One
possible reason could be the presence of strong Lebanese norms to hold negative attitudes
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toward Israelis. Perhaps only when Palestinians (presumably the main enemies of
Israelis) are perceived as less hostile toward Israelis, and Lebanese feel positively and
close to Palestinians, do Lebanese feel justified to feel less hostile toward Israelis as well.
Although this is not explored in this dissertation, future work will examine the role of
norm strength – and other variables – in predicting attitude change within a structural
balance model of third party influence. Nevertheless, these preliminary findings offer
partial support for the main proposition of this paper, highlighting the role of third parties
in the formation of attitudes toward target outgroups.
Perceived Lebanese-Israeli Relations
In addition to looking at how attitudes are formed as a function of third-party
influence, the study looked at whether perceived relations between the three groups
followed the conceptual model of structural balance as well. Therefore, I examined the
influence of perceived Lebanese-Palestinian relations and Palestinian-Israeli relations on
how respondents perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations. Once again, the findings strongly
supported the existence of third-party influence. First, when examined separately,
perceptions of more cooperative and allied relations between Lebanese and Palestinians
predicted perceptions of more competitive and enemy relations between Lebanese and
Israelis. However, when examined alongside the second predictor, results showed that
perceived relations between Palestinians and Israelis played a stronger role in predicting
perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations, and in fact, how respondents thought about
Lebanese-Palestinian relations ceased to influence perceived-Israeli relations.
In summary, among Lebanese participants, how respondents felt toward Israelis
varied as a function of how they perceived Palestinians attitudes toward Israelis and not
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as a function of how they felt toward Palestinians. Similarly, how Lebanese respondents
perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations varied as a function of how they perceived
Palestinian-Israeli relations, more than how they perceived Lebanese-Palestinian
relations.
The Role of Perceived Palestinian-Israeli Similarities
One mechanism that was suggested to take place is that of secondary transfer
effect. The goal of this dissertation is to challenge one notion of secondary transfer, that
the extent of intergroup similarity was what drove people to “transfer” their attitudes
from one group to another. In this context, I found that similarities between Palestinians
and Israelis predicted more positive attitudes toward Israelis; however, a stronger
predictor of these attitudes was, in fact, perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis. In
other words, although intergroup similarity is related to attitudes toward the target
outgroup, perceived third-party attitudes toward the target group influenced these
attitudes more strongly and above and beyond the role of intergroup similarities.
Moreover, I also found that perceived relations between Palestinians and Israelis was the
main driving factor in how respondents perceived relations between Lebanese and
Israelis, above and beyond the role of perceived Palestinian-Israeli similarities.
The Role of Extended Palestinian Contact with Israelis
Another suggested mechanism was that of the extended contact effect, where, in
this case, the way respondents saw Palestinian contact experiences with Israelis would
influence their own attitudes toward Israelis. However, Palestinian contact with Israelis
did not predict attitudes toward Israelis, unless it was examined within the same model as
Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis (see Appendix C for a discussion of the results).
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Furthermore, in that model, Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis were more negative as
Palestinian contact with Israelis was more positive. A similar pattern was also found
when the role of Palestinian-Israeli contact in predicting perceived Lebanese-Israeli
relations was examined. Further examination of the data will aim to uncover potentially
mediating or moderating factors, such as changes in Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis,
which could affect this relationship.
Conclusion
In summary, the preliminary findings from this study partially support the
proposed hypotheses, and demonstrate how the presence of a third party – in this case,
Palestinians – may influence the attitudes that respondents may have toward Israelis, as
well as the relations they perceive other Lebanese may have with Israelis. In this
particular context, it was the perception of the attitudes that Palestinians held toward
Israelis, and of the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis, that subsequently
predicted how respondents felt toward Israelis and how they saw the relationship between
their own group and Israelis. This was further shown to be true above and beyond any
similarities that might have been perceived between Palestinians and Israelis.
The findings from this study provide promising support to the influence of
third parties in the formation of attitudes and relations toward a target outgroup.
However, as a preliminary examination of third party effects, the study also came with a
number of limitations. First, due to the sensitivity of items asking about direct contact
between Lebanese and Israelis, this study was unable to measure the influence of indirect
third party effects, above and beyond those of direct contact. Furthermore, the context in
which the data was collected contains very powerful norms when it comes to political
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attitudes, particularly toward Israelis. Therefore, the majority of respondents (between
50% and 70%) felt strongly negatively toward Israelis and the relationship between
Israelis and both Lebanese and Palestinians, and this made it difficult to assess responses
from across a wide spectrum of attitudes and opinions. Nevertheless, the data provided by
respondents who deviated from these norms and the overall results from this preliminary
study are encouraging. Future survey studies in other contexts should include assessments
of direct contact between the primary group and target outgroup, and where there are no
psychological, social, or legal pressures involved.
Furthermore, with this correlational field survey, it is difficult to determine the
direction of these influences or the causal role of any of the variables. Regression
analyses have shown, in a real world context, that attitudes and relations with a target
outgroup (Israelis) can vary as a function of attitudes and relations with a third party
(Palestinians) and perceived attitudes and relations between that third party and target
outgroup. However, it is possible that one’s relations with Palestinians would be a
product of their relations with Israelis, instead. One method that could offer clearer
conclusion about causality is through a laboratory experiment, which can control for
other potentially influencing factors as well as for the sequence of events and information
obtained by participants. Thus, an experimental study was conducted to simulate a
multigroup context by including three groups. In this study the primary group of
participants interacts with and forms attitudes about a “third party” group before being
introduced to a target outgroup. This experimental study allows for tests of the causal role
of third party effects in a multigroup context.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2:
EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THIRD PARTY EFFECTS
Study 2 seeks to replicate and extend the research presented in Study 1, using
experimental procedures that parallel multi-groups settings through the use of laboratorygenerated groups. The creation of minimal groups in the laboratory has consistently
demonstrated its effectiveness in producing intergroup boundaries and feelings of
belonging that correspond to differences in attitudes toward one’s own group and other
groups (Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears, 1995; Giessner & Mummundey, 2008; Tajfel,
Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Specifically, this experiment tests how a group
member’s contact experiences with a third-party group, and information regarding
relations between a third party and target outgroup, positively or negatively influence
their attitudes toward the target outgroup. Two factors were manipulated: (1) whether
participants experience positive or negative contact with a third-party group; and (2)
whether participants learn that relations between the third-party group and target
outgroup are friendly or hostile. Growing from this design, the study tested two broad
hypotheses:
1) There would be a main effect of valence of participants’ contact with the third-party
group: positive contact with a third-party group would lead to positive attitudes
towards that group, whereas negative contact with a third-party group would lead to
negative attitudes toward that group.
2) The valence of participants’ contact with the third-party group would interact with the
perceived relations between the third-party group and target outgroup, such that:
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a) If participants develop positive attitudes toward a third-party group through
positive contact, and learn of positive relations between the third party group
and target outgroup, participants would anticipate positive relations with the
target outgroup.
b) If participants develop positive attitudes toward a third-party group through
positive contact, and learn of negative relations the third party group and
target outgroup, participants would anticipate negative relations with the
target outgroup.
c) If participants develop negative attitudes toward a third-party group through
negative contact, and learn of positive relations the third party group and
target outgroup, participants would anticipate negative relations with the
target outgroup.
d) If participants develop negative attitudes toward a third-party group through
negative contact, and then learn of negative relations between the third party
group and target outgroup, participants would anticipate positive relations
with the target outgroup.
Participants and Procedure
A total of 201 undergraduate students who were registered in psychology courses
at the University of Massachusetts, and who were eligible to earn experimental credit for
their participation, were recruited for this study. Another criterion for their recruitment
was that they had participated in a prescreening study prior to this one. Although their
specific responses to the prescreening were not used this study, participants were
informed of group membership based on responses to measures assessed during the
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prescreening. Each session required the participation of three undergraduate students who
signed up for the experiment in exchange for course credit. Participants were asked to
come into the lab for two half-hour studies that ostensibly take place within one 60minute testing session. The actual purpose of the testing session was to manipulate the
valence of contact (positive, negative, or “no information” control) between the
participant’s group and a “third party” group of confederates. When students showed up
for the study, they were told that their responses to a prescreening survey had placed
them into one of three groups on the basis of cognitive processing style: “deduction”,
“induction”, or “abduction”. The first two group labels, “Inductive” versus “Deductive”
thinkers, have been used by Doosje et al. (1995) to create minimal laboratory groups. The
third group, “Abductive,” comes from research on computational semiotics that
differentiates between three different kinds of knowledge units or operators: knowledge
extraction (deduction), knowledge generation (induction), and knowledge selection
(abduction; see Gudwin, 2002). In this particular study, participants were told that they
belonged to the “Deductive” processing group.
They were then given a chance to establish an ingroup identity that stems from
their shared processing style, using an abridged version of Wright et al.’s (1997)
experimental procedures. Participants were first assigned a same-colored T-shirt to wear
during the study and then asked to introduce themselves to other members of their group
and spend around four minutes “breaking the ice” by discussing interests that they all
have in common and figuring out what characteristics they, as “Deductive” participants,
might share.
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Participants were taken to a room with one computer and informed that they
would interact “virtually” as a group with the “Inductive” group of students (i.e., thirdparty group), who were ostensibly sitting in a similar computer room; they would work
with the “Inductive” group on some assigned tasks for approximately 15 minutes. Virtual
contact has been used in previous research to emulate direct contact and has often been
found to have similar effects as those observed in direct contact settings (e.g., Hewstone,
Cairns, Voci, Paolini, McLernon, Crisp, Niens, & Craig, 2005; Williams, Cheung, &
Choi, 2000). Following these procedures, participants were given a survey about their
attitudes towards their own group and their expectations for contact with the third party
group, as well as their attitudes toward that group.
To facilitate their work together as a “Deductive” group, participants were
gathered around one computer and shared their tasks. Virtual responses from the
“Inductive” third-party group consisted of one of three different sets of scripts prepared
and programmed in advance, and randomly selected for each testing session. In the
positive contact condition, the third-party group ostensibly communicated pleasant and
friendly statements, such as “we’re really enjoying working on this task with you.” In the
negative contact condition, the third party group ostensibly communicated unpleasant and
hostile statements, such as “working with you has not been fun at all.” In a separate
control condition, the third party remained neutral throughout the interaction. Following
the virtual interaction, participants were seated separately and given a survey to assess
their attitudes toward the “Inductive” third-party group, along with their attitudes about
the task and manipulation checks (see Appendix B for primary measures used in the
study).
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Participants were then informed that they would next interact with a new group
(“Abductive” thinkers, or the “target outgroup”), with whom the “Inductive” (third-party)
group had already interacted. This procedure was used to manipulate participants’
perceptions of relations between the third-party group and the target outgroup. The
researcher then informed one-third of the participants that the third-party group
(“Inductive thinkers”) and the target outgroup (“Abductive thinkers”) got along very well
(positive relations condition), while the other third were told that the two groups did not
get along well at all (negative relations condition). The final third of participants received
no information about the quality of the relations between “Inductive” and “Abductive”
thinkers (control condition).
Following these procedures, participants were asked to complete additional
survey questions to check the effects of the manipulation and assess initial attitudes
toward and anticipated feelings about interacting with the target outgroup (Abductive
thinkers; see below for description of measures). Once they completed the surveys,
participants were fully debriefed of the true purpose of the study, given the opportunity to
discuss the goals of the study, had any of their questions answered, and finally were
thanked for their time.
Measures
The primary goal of this experiment is to examine whether participants’ attitudes
toward third party groups – resulting from positive or negative contact experiences – and
perceived relations between the third party and target outgroups would impact their
subsequent attitudes toward the target outgroup. The survey relied on similar items as to
those included in the field survey described above, but their frames of reference changed
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to the groups involved in the lab experiment. The variables measured in the experiment
are as follows:
Manipulation Checks
Contact and Attitudes toward the Third-Party “Inductive” Group.
To check the effectiveness of the first manipulation, participants were asked to
report their attitudes towards the third party group, with whom they had a virtual
interaction. Items measured the extent to which their contact experience with that group
was positive or negative, and whether the interaction was pleasant or hostile. Twelve
items measuring quality of contact were scored on a 7-point scale, ranging from “1”
(strongly disagree) to “7” strongly agree, where 6 of these items were reverse-coded (α =
.96). The next items assessed participants’ attitudes toward the third party “Inductive”
group, paralleling items used in Study 1. A general evaluation scale asked participants to
describe how negative/positive, cold/warm, hostile/friendly, and suspicious/trusting they
felt toward the “Inductive group”, on a scale from “1” to “7” (adapted from Wright et al.,
1997; α=.94).
Perceived Relationship and Interaction between the Third Party “Inductive” and
Target Outgroup “Abductive”
Twelve survey items asked about the perceived interaction (e.g., friendly-hostile,
positive-negative, etc.) between the “Inductive” and “Abductive” groups (α=.946). Scores
were based on a 7-point scale. In addition, two items examined the perceived relations
between “Inductives” and “Abductives” (cooperative-competitive, allies-enemies) on a
10-point scale, and with a high correlation of r=.791 (α=.880).
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This measure was administered following the feedback that participants received
about the interaction between the third party and target outgroup, and before their own
group expected to interact with the target outgroup. The survey items used here are
similar to those used in Study 1 in assessing the extent to which participants perceived
the relation between the third party and target outgroup to be positive or negative.
Outcome variables
Expectations for Interaction with the Target Outgroup
To assess whether their interaction with the third party group impacts their attitudes
towards a target outgroup, participants indicated whether they felt negatively or
positively toward their upcoming interaction with the target outgroup. The items used for
this measure parallel those used in Study 1, but refer to expectations of future
interactions, rather than actual experiences (e.g, “My interaction with the Abductive
Group will be [pleasant/hostile/friendly/distant]”; see Barlow et al., 2012; Islam &
Hewstone, 1993). They provided their responses on a 12-item general evaluation scale,
with a reliability of α=.819.
Attitudes toward Target Outgroup
Another set of four items asked participants to indicate on a scale from “1” to “7”,
the extent they felt negative/positive, hostile/friendly, cold/warm, and suspicious/trusting
toward the “Abductive” group, with a high reliability of α=.884. These items also parallel
the ones used in Study 1.
Perceived Similarities between the Third Party and Target Outgroup
To account for the possible mediating effect of perceived similarities between the
outgroups, as proposed by Pettigrew’s (2009) description of the secondary transfer effect,
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a single item assessed how similar or different participants perceived the third party and
target outgroups to be. Responses ranged from “very different” to “very similar” on a 10point scale.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Contact and Attitudes toward Third Party “Inductives”
To check whether the interaction conditions with the third-party “Inductive”
group influenced participants’ reports on the interaction and their attitudes toward that
group, a one-way ANOVA was employed. As expected there was a significant effect of
these primary conditions on participants’ reports of the interaction, F(2,197)=78.26,
p<.001, η2=.45. Post hoc analyses revealed that those in the “negative” condition reported
a significantly more negative experience (M =3.40, SD=1.74) with the “Inductive” third
party than those in the positive condition (M =5.69, SD=.82) , p<.001, and those in the
neutral condition (M=5.61, SD=.75) , p<.001. However, there was no significant
difference in reports between those in the “positive” and “neutral” conditions, p=.94.
Similarly, the condition in which the interaction took place significantly
influenced the participants’ attitudes toward the “Inductive” third party group, F (2, 196)
= 58.82, p<.001, η2=.38. Posthoc analysis revealed that participants in the negative
condition reported less positive attitudes toward the Inductive third party group (M=2.76,
SD=1.44) as compared to participants in the positive condition (M=5.30, SD=1.60)),
p<.001, and those in the control condition (M=5.24, SD=1.54), p<.001; no significant
difference between those in the positive and neutral conditions were found, p=.98.
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Together, these findings indicate that the “negative” interaction condition resulted
in more negative responses toward the third party group than the “positive” and “neutral”
contact conditions. Given that in both cases, the means were considerably above the
midpoint of the scale (an average of 5.46 on a 7-point scale), this implies that perhaps the
neutral condition was perceived as positively as the positive condition.
Perceived Interactions and Relations between Third Party “Inductives” and Target
Outgroup “Abductives”
To check whether the false feedback regarding ostensible relations between the
“Inductive” third party and “Abductive” target outgroups influenced participants’
perceptions of that relationship, a one-way ANOVA was employed. The analysis showed
that the feedback condition significantly influenced participants’ perceptions of the
perceived interaction, F (2,194) = 35.27, p <.001, η2=.27, and the perceived relation, F
(2, 194) = 25.72, p <.001, η2=.21 between the “Inductive” and “Abductive” groups.
Participants in the negative condition perceived less positive interactions (M=3.54,
SD=1.07) than participants in the positive condition (M=4.70, SD=.82), p<.001, or
participants in the control condition (M=4.92, SD=1.11) , p<.001. Along similar lines,
participants in the negative condition perceived less positive relations (i.e., that
“Inductives” and “Abductives” were more competitive and like enemies, M=4.17,
SD=2.00) than those in the positive condition (M=6.24, SD=1.78), p<.001, and those in
the control condition (M=6.48, SD=2.25) , p<.001. Once again, there were no significant
difference between participants in the positive and control conditions on perceived
interactions, p=.45, and perceived relations, p=.80. For both outcome measures, mean
scores in the positive and control conditions are above the midpoint (for perceived
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interactions, M=4.81 on a 7-point scale, and for perceived relations, M =5.36 on a 10point scale), suggesting that relations in the control condition are perceived as positively
as those in the positive condition.
Main Outcomes
Based on the procedures outlined above, this experimental study follows a 3
(interaction with third party group: positive/negative/neutral) X 3 (perceived relation
between third party and target outgroup: friendly/hostile/control) factorial design.
Therefore, a 3 (interaction with third party) X 3 (perceived relations between third party
and target outgroup) analysis of variance was employed to predict two outcome variables:
participants’ self-reported attitudes toward the target outgroup and their expectations for
contact with the target outgroup. Similar to the expected results for Study 1, an
interaction between the two predictors was expected, such that participants’ expected
interactions with the “Abductive” target outgroup and attitudes towards the target
outgroup will vary in relation to two factors: first, their own experiences with the third
party group (positive, negative, or control), and the information they receive from the
experimenter about relations (friendly or hostile) between the third party group and target
outgroup. The analysis also included perceived similarity as a possible mediator effects
between the third party and target outgroup.
Expectations for Interaction with the Target Outgroup
Mean scores on expectations for contact with the target outgroup across
experimental conditions are presented in Table 5. Examining first the experimental
effects on expectations for contact with the “Abductive” target outgroup, results showed
a significant main effect of the initial interaction with “Inductives”, F(2,191) = 24.07,
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p<.001, η2=.208. A post hoc Scheffe test revealed that participants who had a negative
experience with the “Inductive” third party group anticipated a significantly more
negative experience with the “Abductive” target outgroup (M=3.91, SD=.89), relative to
those who had a positive experience (M=4.71, SD=1.01, p <.001) or a neutral experience
(M=4.97, SD=.77, p <.001) with the “Inductive” third party group. Once again, though,
there were no significant differences in expectations for contact between those who had
positive and neutral experiences with the “Inductive” third party group p=.244.
As for the main effect of perceived relations, the differences were marginally
significant, F(2, 191)=2.586, p=.078, η2=.027 2. Post hoc analyses show that those who
received negative information about relations between the third party and target
outgroups anticipated a significantly more negative interaction with the “Abductive”
target outgroup (M=4.31, SD=.92) than those who did not receive any information at all
(control condition; M=4.75, SD=1.11, p=.022. There was no significant difference
between participants who received positive information about “Inductive-Abductive”
relations (M=4.56, SD=.92) and the other two conditions.
Additionally, the analysis found no significant interaction effects between the two
experimental conditions on expectations for contact with the target outgroup,
F(4,191)=.45, p=.772, η2=.01.
Attitudes toward the Target Outgroup
Mean attitudes toward the target outgroup (“Abductives”) across experimental
conditions are presented in Table 6. Again, a 3 (interaction with third party) X 3
(perceived relations between third party and target outgroup) analysis of variance was
tested in predicting participants’ attitudes toward the “Abductive” target outgroup. This
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two-way ANOVA again found a main effect of the contact manipulation, F(2,191)=4.71,
p=.01, η2=.05, such that those in the negative contact condition (M=4.11, SD=1.18)
reported significantly less positive attitudes toward the “Abductive” target outgroup than
those participants in the control condition (M=4.76, SD=1.17, p=.013, and marginally less
positive attitudes than those in the positive contact condition (M=4.62, SD=1.33), p=.069.
There was no significant main effect of perceived relations on participants’ attitudes
toward the “abductive” target outgroup, F(2,191)=1.18, p=.310, η2=.013, and the
interaction effect was not significant, F(4,191)=1,13, p=.344, η2=.024.
Perceived Similarities
An additional goal of this paper was to examine the role of the predictor variables
– in this case, effect of interaction with “Inductives” and perceived “InductiveAbductive” relations – beyond the role of perceived similarities between the third party
“Inductives” and target outgroup “Abductives”, in shaping the perceptions and
expectations that group members may develop toward the target outgroup. First, looking
at whether these perceptions were themselves influenced by any of the manipulations, the
information received about the interactions between “Inductives” and “Abductives” does
not significantly influence subsequent perceptions of the similarities between these two
groups, F(2,188)=2.32, p=.101, η2=.025. Interestingly, however, the initial contact that
participants had with “Inductives” does influence these perceptions, F(2,188)=3.77,
p=.015, η2=.040. Furthermore, there is a significant interaction effect between the two
manipulations, F(4,188)=4.05, p=.004, η2=.083.
In line with previous results from this study, a Scheffe post hoc test found that
those who engaged in a negative interaction with “Inductives” later found “Inductives”
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and “Abductives” to be more different (M=5.02, SD=2.11) than those who engaged in a
neutral type of interaction (M=5.98, SD=1.96; p=.023) and marginally more so than those
who engaged in a positive interaction (M=5.77, SD=1.70, p=087). The difference
between those in the positive and neutral conditions was not significant, p=.862.
With respect to the interaction, the differences were found between the negative
and neutral initial contact experiences. For those who had a negative experience with
“Inductives”, while they perceived more “Inductive-Abductive” differences than those in
the neutral (or positive) contact conditions, these perceptions did not significantly vary as
a function of the feedback they received. On the other hand, those in the neutral contact
condition, and also experienced a more positive interaction (based on findings reported
above), perceived those differences to be greater after hearing that “Inductive-Abductive”
relations are bad (M=5.00, SD=1.76) than when they received no information at all about
these relations (M=6.88, SD=1.83), F(1,44)=12.21, p=.001, η2=.22.
To examine the influence of perceptions of similarity/difference, a regression
analysis found that these perceptions significantly predicted participants’ expectations of
their upcoming interactions, such that the more similar they perceived “Inductives” and
“Abductives” to be, the more positive they expected their upcoming interactions with the
“Abductives” to be, b=.18, SE=.03, p<.001, controlling for the effects of both
independent variables (contact experience and feedback). Nevertheless, the two main
independent variables were still strong predictors of participants’ expectations above and
beyond the influence of perceived similarity (for contact with “Inductives”, b=.44,
SE=.07, p<.001; for information about the two groups’ interaction, b=.15, SE=.07,
p=.04). As for attitude formation, although perceived similarity does predict participant
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attitudes toward “Abductives”, b=.16, SE=.05, p=.001, the contact experience that takes
place with “Inductives” remains a strong predictor of attitudes toward “Abductives”,
above and beyond that of perceived similarity, b=.26, SE=11, p=.02.
Discussion
The goal of the experimental study was to examine whether a third party group
directly causes changes in perceptions of and attitudes toward a target outgroup. To test
that, three-person groups were formed in a lab, where they interacted with a designated
“third party”, then received information about the relations between that third party and
another “target outgroup”, and were subsequently asked to report their expectations for
contact and attitudes toward that target outgroup. The experiment purposefully allowed
no contact between the participant group and target outgroup, in order to unambiguously
identify the source(s) of the attitudes formed toward them.
The results clearly pointed to a strong influence of contact with the third party
(“Inductives”) on participants’ expectations and attitudes toward the target outgroup
(“Abductives”). Specifically, when the interaction with “Inductives” was negative,
participants had more negative expectations and more negative attitudes toward
“Abductives” – whom they had not interacted with yet – than when the interaction with
“Inductives” was positive or neutral. Furthermore, when the information that participants
received was examined, analysis found that participants who heard that the “InductiveAbductive” relationship was negative subsequently reported more negative expectations
about their upcoming interaction with “Abductives” than those who heard positive
information or no information at all about the relationship. This manipulation did not
influence participants’ attitudes toward “Abuctives”, however.
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More importantly, participants seemed to be more affected by their initial
interaction with the third party “Inductives’ than by the information they received
regarding that third party’s experience with the target outgroup “Abductives”. Given the
setup of the experiment, though, this is not entirely unexpected. To begin with, one would
expect that direct contact would have a stronger impact in this case, since participants had
no knowledge about “Deductives”, “Inductives”, or “Abductives” prior to entering the
experimental session, and thus basing their responses on information obtained within just
an hour. Second, participants are exposed to the third party and undergo a pleasant,
unpleasant, or neutral interaction with them for about 15 minutes, whereas they are
exposed to the information about the “Inductive-Abductive” relationship for less than
four seconds. Therefore, a manipulation that lasted significantly longer and that also
required interaction and involved an emotional provocation may more likely influence
participants’ subsequent responses than a manipulation that was considerably briefer and
did not require any sort of give-and-take from the participants. This weaker second
manipulation could also explain why no interaction was found between the two
independent variables. Future studies should take that into account and ensure that
participants are exposed to the second manipulation (i.e., information about the
“Inductive-Abductive” interaction) for a more substantial amount of time, and with more
substantive detail than a simple “They did/did not get along” statement that would also
allow for active processing of that information.
The study also examined the role of perceived similarities. First, information
about the relationship between the “Inductives” and “Abductives” did not influence how
similar or different they were perceived to be. Interestingly, though, the interaction that
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occurred between the participants and “Inductives” did affect these perceptions, such that
a negative interaction led participants to perceive the “Inductives” and “Abductives” as
more different than a positive or neutral interaction did. Again, this could be explained by
the high likelihood that that first manipulation was stronger and more impactful,
especially when it was negative. It is also possible that participants viewed that particular
negative contact experience – and by association, that “Inductive” group – as an
exception and not what is typical in these laboratory settings. 3 If participants saw the
“Inductives” as deviating from the norm, then they might consequently assume that the
“Inductives” are not a typical representation of other groups in this setting, including the
“Abductives”. Unfortunately, the study did not measure whether participants found the
“Inductives” to be a typical or exceptional group, and this potential factor should be
explored in future studies.
The study also found that participants’ perceptions of similarities varied when
they had a neutral contact experience with the “Inductives”. For that subgroup, when they
were told that the “Inductive-Abductive” contact was negative, they were more likely to
conclude that these two groups were also more different from each other than when they
received no information. Therefore, when the interaction was neutral, participants relied
on the information they received about the “Inductive-Abductive” interaction to inform
their perceptions of how similar or different these two groups may be.
Next, when “Inductives” and “Abductives” were perceived to be more similar,
participant attitudes toward “Abductives” were more positive, across all conditions of the
experiment. More importantly, however, the interaction with the third-party group still
played a significant role in shaping participant attitudes toward “Abductives”, above and
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beyond the influence of perceived similarities. Moreover, both the interaction with
“Inductives” as well as the perceived “Inductive-Abductive” relation influenced how
participants anticipated their upcoming interaction with “Abductives” to go, above and
beyond the role of perceived “Inductive-Abductive” similarities.
The results of this study are encouraging and indicative of a strong influence of
third parties, at least in the initial stage. This is reflective of the mechanisms behind
secondary transfer (Pettigrew, 2009), although the future goal of this research is to focus
on strengthening the second predictor – relationship between the third party and target
outgroup – in order to examine the full extent of the role that this additional factor may
play. Moreover, additional measures could directly ask participants what they based their
judgments on, regarding the target outgroups.
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CHAPTER 4
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In sum, the findings from the field survey and experimental study provide partial
support for the hypotheses of this paper, and strong preliminary support for the role of
third parties in influencing the way people perceive and feel toward target outgroups. In
the field survey, it was the relationship and attitudes held by the third party (Palestinians)
toward the target outgroup (Israelis) that predicted Lebanese respondents’ own attitudes
and perceptions regarding Israelis. This fits within the political context in Lebanon, a
place where strong norms and pressures exist concerning people’s stance toward Israelis,
such that people might only be willing to justify their deviating judgments if they
perceived – or at least portrayed – the third party Palestinians as a group that has varied
its judgments as well. Since Palestinians have been the main victims of the conflict with
Israelis, it may be difficult for the Lebanese to express anything less negative about
Israelis until Palestinians do so first and provide “permission” for Lebanese to follow
suit.
In the experimental study, on the other hand, it was the participants’ interaction
with the third party that was the main driving force. As mentioned earlier, this is likely
the result of a considerably powerful first manipulation (contact with “Inductives”) and a
relatively weaker second manipulation (“Inductive-Abductive” relationship). This could
be modified in a follow-up study, where more attention would be given to that second
factor so that it has an equitable impact to that of the first predictor (contact with
“Inductives”).
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Moreover, a future study should also examine the predictive role of these factors
in contexts where direct contact with the target outgroup exists. This scenario is also not
unlike real-life contexts where all three groups may interact with one another, but where
the mechanisms that underlie structural balance could still exist.
Finally, these preliminary findings open the door for additional questions and
paths that can be examined within multigroup contexts. For instance, would the relative
status or power of the third party group, with respect to the individual’s group and a
target outgroup, matter? In other words, would a third party that is seen as having lower
status than one’s own group still be able to play a strong role in shaping attitudes and
perceptions toward the target outgroup? Furthermore, would the same mechanisms exist
in contexts that include more than three groups? How would structural balance manifest
itself, and how would group members form judgments, if they were faced with multiple
third parties? These are questions that are well worth examining in future studies within
this line of research and the author remains excited in pursuing these multiple variables
and issues that arise when exploring the many facets of third party influence and multiple
group relations.
Broader Implications
There are numerous intergroup contexts in the world that involve more than two
groups in conflict, where some may establish formal or informal coalitions with other
groups, while distancing themselves from other groups. The processes described in this
paper carry important implications for how members of different groups form
alliances or enemy relations (see Alexander, Brewer, & Livingston, 2005; Alexander,
Brewer, & Hermann, 1999). Appraisals of the nature of a relationship, and subsequently
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kind of threat or opportunities that an outgroup poses, gives rise to distinct emotional
reactions, which can then lead to the formation of distinct group images (e.g., ally vs.
enemy), and to distinct action tendencies (e.g., aggression, self-protection) that
correspond to those images (Alexander et al., 1999; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Hermann
(1985) noted that the formation of group images falls in line with Heider’s (1958) balance
theory. To maintain a positive moral image of one’s own group, the cognitive system
looks at the threat or opportunity presented by the outgroup and draws an image of that
outgroup that will create balance (Hermann, 1985). What is novel about the research in
this paper is that it recognizes the existence of more than one group, and how this added
complexity might inform how we evaluate and form attitudes toward other groups. In
contexts with multiple groups, members of each group must evaluate their relationship
with one outgroup, while taking into account that group’s relationship with even other
outgroups. These factors could illuminate the psychological processes that are involved in
coalition building, especially in areas with ongoing conflict, and where coalitions and
alliances serve to enhance a group’s strength and ability to respond to potential threats.
What also becomes clear from the preceding discussion is that greater research
attention is needed to understand both positive and negative processes involved in
intergroup contact. Research on secondary transfer effects have focused mainly on
positive effects of attitude transference, and extended contact research has focused
mainly on positive effects in relation to knowledge of ingroup members’ intergroup
contact experiences. In reality, attitudes can change drastically and in both positive as
well as negative directions. In line with previous research (e.g., Barlow et al., 2012;
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Paolini et al., 2010), the experimental study has shown that negative contact processes
may have stronger influence on attitudes than positive contact.
In multi-group settings, where three or more groups are involved, the influence of
positive as well as negative processes may become more complicated. Not only do
groups in this context have to contend with the negative contact experiences, attitudes, or
relations that occur with one group, but with how these processes unfold in the presence
of a third influential group. In summary, when multiple groups exist, relational dynamics
become more complex than what the existing literature on intergroup relations presents.
The current research hopes to have shed some light on the possible factors that may play
a role in building coalitions and forming attitudes towards multiple groups.
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Table 1
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations Measures of Contact, Attitudes, and
Perceived Relations and between Lebanese, Palestinians, and Israelis
N

Mean

SD

Lebanese Attitudes toward Palestinians

370

4.87

1.53

Perceived Palestinian Attitudes toward Israelis

361

2.18

2.20

Perceived Lebanese-Palestinian Relations

376

3.66

1.84

Perceived Palestinian-Israeli Relations

385

.74

1.50

Lebanese Contact with Palestinians

234

5.15

.91

Perceived Palestinian Contact with Israelis

354

1.77

.84

Perceived Lebanese-Palestinian Similarities

388

4.87

1.64

Perceived Palestinian-Israeli Similarities

384

2.13

1.94

Perceived Lebanese-Israeli Similarities

377

1.87

1.82

Lebanese Attitudes toward Israelis

377

1.96

2.06

Perceived Lebanese-Israeli Relations

384

.58

1.50

Primary Predictor Measures

Secondary Predictor Measures

Outcome Measures
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Table 2
Correlation Matrix for Measures of Attitudes, Perceived Relations, Perceived
Similarity, and Contact
1

2

1

Contact with Pal

2

Attitudes toward Pal

.45**

3

Pal. Contact w. Isr

-.30** -.20*

4

Pal Attitudes to Isr

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1
1
1

-.11

.23*

.04

1

-.02

.92**

5

Leb Attitudes to Isr

-.06

.29**

6

Leb-Pal Relations

.19**

.02

7

Pal-Isr Relations

-.16*

-.11*

.07

-.09

-.08

-.22**

8

Leb-Isr Relations

-.16*

-.02

-.01

-.07

-.04

-.19** .87**

Leb-Pal Similarities

.28**

.54**

.22**

.28**

.33**

.16**

10 Pal-Isr Similarities

-.09

.20** .07**

.79**

.74** -.64**

-.07

-.10* .22**

11 Leb-Isr Similairities

-.10

.30**

.81**

.78** -.61**

.06

-.02 .26** .89** 1

9

1

-.17** -.61** -.55**

.03

1
1
-.21**

1
-.13*

1
1

Note: For correlations that include direct contact with Palestinians, sample size ranges
from 197 to 234. With the remaining variables, however, sample size ranged from 229 to
384.
** p < .01 (2-tailed); * p < .05 (2-tailed)
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Table 3
Logistic Regression Outcome Table for Predicting Lebanese Attitudes toward
Israelis
Parameter Estimate

SE

Wald

Exp(B)

Constant

1.43*

.58

6.10

.24

Attitudes to Palestinians

.35**

.12

9.33

1.43

Perceived Pal Attitudes to Israelis

3.95**

1.41

7.88

.02

.18

.25

.51

1.20

Att to Pal X Pal Att to Israelis
** p < .01; * p < .05
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Table 4
Logistic Regression Outcome Table for Predicting Perceived Relations between
Lebanese and Israelis
Parameter Estimate

SE

Wald

Exp(B)

Constant

1.34*

.57

5.51

3.8

Lebanese-Palestinian Relations

.33**

.13

6.76

.03

3.49***

.84

17.17

.03

.25

.18

2.02

3.80

Palestinian-Israeli Relations
Leb-Pal Rel X Pal-Isr Rel
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
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Table 5
Mean scores for expectations for contact following both conditions of interaction
with “Inductives” and perceived relations of “Inductives” and “Abductives”
DED-IND Interaction

IND-ABD Interaction

N

M

SD

Negative

Negative (Enemy)

24

3.79

.696

Positive (Ally)

21

4.03

1.05

Control

18

3.92

.94

Total

63

3.91

.89

Negative (Enemy)

21

4.43

.98

Positive (Ally)

21

4.69

.74

Control

21

5.01

1.20

Total

63

4.71

1.01

Negative (Enemy)

21

4.80

.79

Positive (Ally)

21

4.95

.69

Control

24

5.15

.82

Total

66

4.97

.77

Negative (Enemy)

66

4.31

.92

Positive (Ally)

63

4.56

.92

Control

63

4.75

1.11

Positive

Neutral

Total

62

Table 6
Mean scores for attitudes toward “Abductives” following both conditions of
interaction with “Inductives” and perceived relations of “Inductives” and
“Abductives”
DED-IND Interaction

IND-ABD Interaction

N

M

SD

Negative

Negative (Enemy)

24

4.11

1.14

Positive (Ally)

21

4.15

1.43

Control

18

4.10

.96

Total

63

4.11

1.18

Negative (Enemy)

21

4.50

1.48

Positive (Ally)

21

4.60

1.49

Control

21

4.76

1.01

Total

63

4.62

1.33

Negative (Enemy)

21

4.82

1.03

Positive (Ally)

21

4.23

1.20

Control

24

5.17

1.13

Total

66

4.76

1.17

Negative (Enemy)

66

4.46

1.24

Positive (Ally)

63

4.33

1.37

Control

63

4.71

1.12

Positive

Neutral

Total

63

Figure 1: Conceptual model: How attitudes/relations toward a third party and
perceived relations between the third party and target outgroup are expected to
predict attitudes/relations toward that target outgroup.

Positive
Attitudes
toward Third
Party

I like
Negative
TPG

Attitudes
toward Third
Party

I like
TPG

Positive perceived attitudes b/w Third Party & Target Group

(+) Att to Target Group

I like TPG
Negative
perceived attitudes b/w Third Party & Target Group

liketoTPG
(-)I Att
Target Group

I like TPG

I like TPG

Positive perceived attitudes b/w Third Party & Target Group

I like TPG

Negative perceived attitudes b/w Third Party & Target Group

I like TPG

(-) Att to Target Group

I like TPG

(+) Att to Target Group

I like TPG
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Figure 2: Frequency distribution graphs (histograms) depicting Lebanese selfreports on their attitudes toward Israelis (skewness = 1.89, SD = .13) compared to
toward Palestinians (skewness = -.49, SD = .13).
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Figure 3: Binary regression graph depicting Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis as a
function of their attitudes toward Palestinians and their perceptions of Palestinian
attitudes toward Israelis.
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Figure 4: Binary regression graph depicting perceived Lebanese-Israeli as a
function of their perceptions of Lebanese-Palestinian and Palestinian-Israeli
relations.
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APPENDIX A
EXCERPTS FROM SURVEY ASSESSING LEBANESE RELATIONS WITH
PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS
Measures to Test Third-Party Effects
Lebanese contact with Palestinians.
Please respond to the following questions based on YOUR experiences and how YOU feel towards
PALESTINIANS.
1) Have you had any form of contact with Palestinians?

Yes

No

If you have answered “No” to question 1, please skip to item 7
2)

If you have had contact with Palestinians, how much contact have you had with Palestinians who live
in:
Not much
contact

a.
b.
c.
d.

3)

Lebanon
West Bank/Gaza
Jordan
Other (specify):
______________

A great deal
of contact

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

6
6
6

7
7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

If you have had contact with Palestinians, please indicate how often you have had each type of
contact with Palestinians, using the number that best represents your response.
I have never had any form of contact or interaction with Palestinians
Almost Never

e.
f.
g.
h.

Face-to-face
Over the phone
By email
Blogospheres/ chat
rooms
i. Social network
website
(Facebook…)
j. Other (specify):
______________
4)

Almost Always

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

6
6
6

7
7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Of the Palestinians you know, how many would you consider to be close friends?
Almost none of
them

1

2

3

4

5)
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5

6

Almost all of
them

6)

Please reflect on your interactions with Palestinians, when responding to the items below:
Almost
Never

How often have you had had POSITIVE
CONTACT EXPERIENCES with Palestinians?
How often have you had FRIENDLY
INTERACTIONS with Palestinians?
How often have you had HOSTILE
INTERACTIONS with Palestinians?
How often have you had NEGATIVE
CONTACT EXPERIENCES with Palestinians?
7)

Sometimes

Almost
Always

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Please read the following statements and circle the number that corresponds with your level of
agreement to each statement.
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Undecided

1.

When I interact with Palestinians the
contact is almost always pleasant.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.

When I interact with Palestinians we
almost always interact as equals.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.

When I interact with Palestinians the
contact is almost always unpleasant.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4.

When I interact with Palestinians,
there are almost always differences
in power or status.
5.
When I interact with Palestinians the
contact is almost always friendly.
6.
When I interact with Palestinians it
often feels like we cooperate well
with each other.
7.
When I interact with Palestinians the
contact is almost always hostile.
8.
When I interact with Palestinians it
often feels like we are competing
with each other.
9. When I interact with Palestinians I
feel that the contact is intimate like
being with good friends and family.
10. When I interact with Palestinians I
feel that the contact is distant like
with strangers or people unknown to
me.

Lebanese attitudes toward Palestinians.
8)

Think about how you feel toward Palestinians in general.
To what extent do you feel? (circle number to indicate your response)
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a. Negative

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Positive

b. Cold

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Warm

c. Hostile

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Friendly

d. Suspicious

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Trusting

Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis.
9)

Think about how you feel toward Israelis in general.
To what extent do you feel? (circle number to indicate your response)

a. Negative

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Positive

b. Cold

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Warm

c. Hostile

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Friendly

d. Suspicious

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Trusting

Process variables.
Perceived Similarity.
1)

Please indicate below how different or similar these pairs of groups are in terms of political
ideology:

Palestinians & Israelis
Very Different
2)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Very Similar

Please indicate below how different or similar these pairs of groups are in terms of cultural
values:

Palestinians & Israelis
Very Different
3)

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Very Similar

Please indicate below how different or similar these pairs of groups are in terms of goals and
interests:

Palestinians & Israelis
Very Different

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Very Similar

Perceived Relations.
4)

Please indicate on a scale of 1 -10 the extent to which the groups below are in a cooperative vs.
competitive relationship:

Palestinians & Israelis
Cooperative

1

2

3

4

5

6

5)

7

8

9

10

Competitive

Please indicate on a scale of 1 -10 the extent to which the groups below have an ally versus
enemy relationship:
Palestinians & Israelis
Enemy
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Ally
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Extended contact between Palestinians and Israelis.
6)

Please respond to the following questions based on the PALESTINIAN people that you know
None

Few

Some

Many

Very
Many

How many Palestinians do you know that have had
POSITIVE CONTACT EXPERIENCES with Israelis?

1

2

3

4

5

How many Palestinians do you know that have had
FRIENDLY INTERACTIONS with Israelis?

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

How many Palestinians do you know that have
developed FRIENDSHIPS with Israelis?
How many Palestinians do you know that have had
HOSTILE INTERACTIONS with Israelis?
How many Palestinians do you know that have had
NEGATIVE CONTACT EXPERIENCES with Israelis?
7)

AMONG THE PALESTINIANS YOU KNOW WHO HAVE HAD CONTACT WITH ISRAELIS,
WHEN THEY INTERACT WITH ISRAELIS…
Strongly
Disagree

1. .. the contact is almost always
pleasant.
2. ..they almost always interact as
equals.
3. .. the contact is almost always
unpleasant.

Strongly
Agree

Undecided

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. .. there are almost always differences
in power or status.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. .. the contact is almost always
friendly.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6. .. it often seems like they cooperate
well with each other.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. .. the contact is almost always
hostile.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8. .. it often seems like they are
competing with each other.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9. .. it seems like the contact is intimate
like being with good friends and
family.
10. .. it seems like the contact is distant
like with strangers or people
unknown to THEM.
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APPENDIX B
ITEMS ASSESSING PARTICIPANT RESPONSES TOWARD EXPERIMENTAL
THIRD PARTY AND TARGET GROUPS
Measures to Test Third-Party Effects
Participant contact with third party “deductive” group (manipulation check).
Please respond to the following questions based on your experiences with the DEDUCTIVE GROUP.
Please read the following statements and circle the number that corresponds with your level of agreement
to each statement.
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree
Undecided
Agree
1. My interaction with the Deductive
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Group was pleasant.
2. My interaction with the Deductive
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Group was as equals.
3.

My interaction with the Deductive
Group was unpleasant.

4.

My interaction with the Deductive
Group was based on differences in
power or status.
My interaction with the Deductive
Group was friendly.
I felt like we cooperate well with
each other.

5.
6.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7.

My interaction with the Deductive
Group was hostile.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8.

I felt like we were competing with
each other.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9. I felt like the interaction was intimate
like being with good friends.
10. I felt that the contact is distant like
with strangers or people unknown to
me.
11. I had a positive experience with the
Deductive Group
12. I had a negative experience with the
Deductive Group

Participant attitudes toward the “Deductive” group.
13) Think about how you feel toward the Deductive Group.
To what extent do you feel? (circle number to indicate your response)

a.
b.
c.
d.

Negative

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Positive

Cold

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Warm

Hostile

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Friendly

Suspicious

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Trusting
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Participant attitudes toward the target “Abductive” group.
14) Think about how you feel toward the Abductive Group.
To what extent do you feel? (circle number to indicate your response)

a. Negative

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Positive

b. Cold

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Warm

c. Hostile

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Friendly

d. Suspicious

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Trusting

Participant Inductive Group anticipated contact with target Abductive Group.
Please reflect on your upcoming interactions with the Abductive Group, when responding to the items
below:
Please read the following statements and circle the number that corresponds with your level of agreement
to each statement.
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Undecided

1.

My interaction with the Abductive
Group will be pleasant.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.

My interaction with the Abductive
Group will be as equals.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.

My interaction with the Abductive
Group will be unpleasant.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4.

My interaction with the Abductive
Group will be based on differences
in power or status.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5.

My interaction with the Abductive
Group will be friendly.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I feel like we will cooperate well
with each other.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My interaction with the Abductive
Group will be hostile.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I feel like we will be competing with
each other.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6.

7.
8.
9.

I feel like the interaction will be
intimate like being with good
friends.

10. I feel that the contact will be distant
like with strangers or people
unknown to me.
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11.

12.

I will have a positive experience
with the Abductive Group

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I will have a negative experience
with the Abductive Group

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Perceived Similarity between the third party “Deductive” and target “Abductive” groups.
27) Please indicate below how different or similar you believe the “Deductive” and “Abductive”
Groups are:
Very Different
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Very Similar
Process variables (Manipulation Checks).
Perceived Relations between the third party “Deductive” and target “Abductive” groups.
28) Please indicate on a scale of 1 -10 the extent to which the “Deductive” and “Abductive” Groups
have a cooperative vs. competitive relationship:
Cooperative
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Competitive
29) Please indicate on a scale of 1 -10 the extent to which they may be allies versus enemies with one
another relationship:
Enemy
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Ally
Perceived extended contact between third party (“Deductive”) and target “Abductive” groups.
Please think about the Deductive Group and their experiences with the Abductive Group when responding
to the items below.
WHEN THE DEDUCTIVE and ABDUCTIVE GROUPS INTERACTED WITH EACH OTHER…
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Undecided

1. .. the contact was pleasant.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. ..they interacted as equals.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. .. the contact was unpleasant.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

4. .. there were differences in power or
status.
5. .. the contact was friendly.
6. .. it seems like they cooperated well
with each other.
7. .. the contact was hostile.
8. .. it seems like they were competing
with each other.
9. .. it seems like the contact was
intimate like being with good
friends.
10. .. it seems like the contact was distant
like with strangers or people
unknown to THEM.
11. … the contact was positive
12. … the contact was negative
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APPENDIX C
FIELD SURVEY – TREATING CONSTRUCTS AS CONTINUOUS VARIABLES

Below are the results of linear regression analyses that parallel analyses
conducted through binary logistic regression, which treat some constructs as dichotomous
rather than continuous. It is worth mentioning, though, that both types of analyses yielded
very similar results and this provide confidence in the results provided in both sections of
the paper.
The overall model included both predictors (Lebanese attitudes toward
Palestinians and perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis) and their interaction
term, with adjusted R2 = .86. First, perceived attitudes of Palestinians toward Israelis
significantly predicted Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, b=.68, SE=.08, p<.001. In other
words, with every one unit increase in respondents’ perceptions of positive Palestinian
attitudes toward Israelis, respondents’ own positive attitudes toward Israelis increased at
a rate of .68. However, the main effect of attitudes toward Palestinians did not uniquely
predict attitudes toward Israelis, b=.02, SE=.04, p=.65. Nevertheless, there is a significant
interaction effect of these two predictor variables, b=.036, SE=.01, p=.005. When
Palestinians are perceived to hold more negative attitudes toward Israelis (i.e., when
respondents scored these attitudes as low as “1”), Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis
remain negative as well, regardless of their attitudes toward Palestinians, b=.05, SE=.03,
p=.08. However, when Palestinians were perceived to hold more positive attitudes toward
Israelis (i.e., when respondents scored these attitudes as higher than “1”), the more
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positively respondents felt toward Palestinians, the more positively they felt toward
Israelis, b=.91, SE=.13, p<.001 (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Regression graph depicting Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis as a function of
their attitudes toward Palestinians and their perceptions of Palestinian attitudes toward
Israelis.

Perceived Palestinian
Attitudes toward Israelis

The next regression model examined both Lebanese attitudes toward Palestinians
and perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations as predictors for Lebanese attitudes toward
Israelis, as well as their interaction term, adjusted R2 = .09. The zero-order correlation
above had already revealed that perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations did not correlate
with Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, β=.08, p=.12 and thus, as expected, the
regression shows that perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations does not significantly predict
Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, b=.34, SE=.22, p=.13. Similarly reflecting the zeroorder correlations obtained, attitudes toward Palestinians significantly predicted Lebanese
attitudes toward Israelis, b=.54, SE=.11, p<.001. This would imply that overall, with
every one unit increase in respondents’ positive attitudes toward Palestinians, their
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positive attitudes toward Israelis increased at a rate of .54. Moreover, the interaction
effect in this model is marginally significant, b = -.08, SE=.04, p=.06. However, the
previous regression analysis demonstrated that the relationship between respondents’
attitudes toward Palestinians and their attitudes toward Israelis in fact varies as a function
of perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis. Therefore, an interpretation of results
that does not include that moderator (perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis) must
be performed with caution.
In addition, although perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations do not predict
respondents’ attitudes toward Israelis, the zero-order correlation showed a significant
relation between perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations and Lebanese-Israeli relations.
Therefore, the following section examines the extent that respondents perceive all
relations between multiple groups within a framework of structural balance.
Predicting Perceived Relations between Lebanese and Israelis. To test the
presence of structural balance for the three groups, perceived relations between each pair
(Lebanese-Palestinians; Palestinians-Israelis; Lebanese-Israelis) were examined.
Correlational analysis (found in Table 2) indicate that the more Lebanese and Palestinians
were perceived as allies, the more Lebanese and Israelis were perceived as enemies, r = .19, p < .001. Furthermore, the more Palestinians and Israelis were perceived as enemies,
the more Lebanese and Israelis were also perceived as enemies, r = .87, p < .001.
However, when both variables and their interaction term were entered into a regression
equation (adjusted R2= .72), findings show that perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations are
significant predictors of perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations, b=.96, SE=.07, p<.001,
whereas perceived Lebanese-Palestinian relations no longer predict perceived Lebanese77

Israeli relations, b=.03, SE=.03, p=.30. In addition, when controlling for the two main
effects, there was no significant interaction effect of perceived Lebanese-Palestinian
Relations X Palestinian-Israeli Relations, b=.03, SE=.02, p=.15. Therefore, we conclude
that the way respondents perceive Lebanese-Israeli relations depends on the way they
perceive Palestinian-Israeli relations, but perceived Lebanese-Palestinian relations do not
play any role in the prediction (see Figure 6 below).
Figure 6: Linear regression graph depicting perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations as a
function of perceived Lebanese-Palestinian relations and perceived Palestinian-Israeli
relations.
Perceived PalestinianIsraeli Relations

Adding Perceived Similarity as a Predictor. The purpose of asking respondents
about their perceptions of similarities between groups was to assess the role that group
similarities might play when it comes to third party influence. Correlations presented in
Table 2 show that perceived similarities between Palestinians and Israelis is positively
correlated with Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, r=.74, p<.001. Furthermore, perceived
Lebanese-Israeli relations were negatively correlated with perceived Lebanese78

Palestinian similarities, b=-.13, p=.012, but not significantly correlated with perceived
Palestinian-Israeli or Lebanese-Israeli similarities. The hypothesis of this paper posits
that the effects of perceived attitudes and relations between Palestinians and Israelis will
be observed beyond the role of perceived similarity. This was tested with both outcome
variables, attitudes toward Israelis and perceived relations between Lebanese and
Israelis. First, “Palestinian-Israeli similarities” was entered into a regression equation
with “perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis”. This model was a better fit for the
data than a model containing “perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis” alone,
change in R2= .002, F(1,341)=4.01, p =.046. Controlling for Palestinian-Israeli
similarities, perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis strongly predicted
respondents’ attitudes toward Israelis, b=.86, SE=03, p<.001. More importantly, the semipartial correlation for this predictor only drops to r=.53 (from a zero-order correlation of
.92). On the other hand, while controlling for these perceived attitudes, we find that
perceived Palestinian-Israeli similarity also predicts attitudes toward Israelis, b=.07,
SE=.04, p=.046. However, the partial correlation here drops to r=.04 (from a zero-order
r=.75), indicating that perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis are stronger than
perceived Palestinian-Israeli similarities in predicting respondents’ attitudes toward
Israelis.
As for the role of perceived Palestinian-Israeli similarities on perceptions of
Lebanese-Israeli relations, including this measure in a regression with Palestinian-Israeli
relations does not improve the model, change in R2=.002, F(1, 379) = 2.67, p=.10.
Perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations is still a strong predictor of perceived LebaneseIsraeli relations, b=.87, SE=.03, p<.001, such that the more respondents feel that
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Palestinians and Israelis are enemies, the more they also feel that Lebanese and Israelis
are enemies, adjusted R2 = .75. Once again, the semi-partial correlation in this case
merely drops to r=.86 (from a zero-order r=.87). However, while controlling for
perceived relations, perceived similarity between Palestinians and Israelis does not have a
significant influence on the perceived relations between them, b=-.03, SE=.02, p=.10, and
the semi-partial correlation is r= -.04 (from a zero-order r=-.10). These two findings
indicate that perceived Palestinian attitudes toward or relations with Israelis are stronger
predictors of respondents’ attitudes toward Israelis and perceived relations LebaneseIsraeli relations, respectively, above and beyond the influence of perceived PalestinianIsraeli similarities.
Adding Extended Contact as a Predictor. Secondary processes such as “third-party”
extended contact were assessed by asking participants to report their knowledge of
members of the third-party group’s (Palestinians’) contact experiences with the target
outgroup (Israelis). A linear regression analysis reveals that Palestinian contact
experiences with Israelis did not significantly predict Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis,
b= -.05, SE = .13, p .72 or perceived Lebanese-Israeli relations, b=.02, SE=.10, p=.86.
Nonetheless, we tested whether extended contact may contribute to predicting Lebanese
attitudes toward Israelis, beyond what could be predicted by perceived Palestinian
attitudes or relations with Israelis. Hence, when this measure (perceived Palestinian
contact with Israelis) was included in the model with perceived Palestinian attitudes
toward Israelis, the model showed a significant improvement R2 change =.003, F(1,334),
=6.07, p=.014. Furthermore, in this model, perceived extended contact between
Palestinians and Israelis significantly predicted Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis, b= -

80

.12, SE=.06, p=.04, such that more positive perceived contact between Palestinians and
Israelis predicted more negative Lebanese attitudes toward Israelis. When included with
perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations in the model predicting Lebanese attitudes toward
Israelis, however, there was no significant improvement of fit, R2 change <.000,
F(1,336), = .02, p=.089. Nevertheless, the same model predicting perceived LebaneseIsraeli relations showed a significant improvement over one that only included perceived
Palestinian-Israeli relations. While perceived Palestinian-Israeli relations remains a
stronger predictor, b=.90, SE=03, p<.001, perceived Palestinian contact with Israelis is
able to account for some of the remaining variance, b=-.10, .05, p=.02.4
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APPENDIX D
NOTES
1

The specific variables are: (1) perceived Palestinian contact with Israelis, (2)
perceived Palestinian attitudes toward Israelis, (3) respondents’ attitudes toward Israelis,
(4) perceived relations between Palestinians and Israelis, (5) perceived relations between
Lebanese and Israelis, (6) perceived similarities between Palestinians and Israelis, and (7)
perceived similarities between Lebanese and Israelis.
When not controlling for “contact with inductives” as an interacting variable, the
effect of the perceived Inductive-Abductive relationship becomes significant,
F(2,191)=3.196, p=.043, η2=.033.
2

To support this, a comparison of how participants felt toward the “inductives”
before and after the interaction reveals a significant difference, such that for the subgroup
who went through the negative interaction, their scores on the thermometer dropped two
points (on a 7-point scale) after the interaction (pre-interaction m=4.76, sd=1.50; postinteraction m=2.77, sd=1.45), t(64)= -8.26, se=.24, p<.001). On the other hand, attitudes
toward “inductives” improved following a positive and neutral interaction, t(130)=4.83,
se=.13, p<.001.
3

4

Extended contact was tested in other models, where it did not significantly
predict any of the outcome variables, except in the cases stated above, where the direction
was opposite of what the paper proposes. Due to these inconsistencies, interpreting
results related to this measure require further examination of the data, pertaining to
possible moderators (e.g., this influence may be mediated by perceived LebanesePalestinian relations, which is negatively correlated with Palestinian-Israeli contact, r= .17, p=.001). Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of this dissertation but will be
examined in future work.
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